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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: Maritime Law Enforcement in Nigeria: The Challenges of
Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea
Degree:

MSc

This dissertation is a study of maritime law enforcement against piracy and armed
robbery at sea in Nigeria. It identifies the challenges of combatting the offences by
examining national and regional law enforcement measures.
The research examines the trends in piracy and the causes of piracy. The international,
national and regional legal framework in place to combat piracy and armed robbery at
sea are further outlined and analysed with emphasis on their applicability and their
gaps. Law enforcement measures carried out by national maritime institutions are
evaluated in order to identify gaps in the measures and to explore the reasons for the
gaps. The research examines cooperative response against piracy and armed robbery
at sea at the regional level in order to assess their effectiveness and shortcomings.
The challenges of combatting piracy and armed robbery at sea in Nigeria and at the
regional level are identified as well as the efforts made by the Nigerian government to
reduce the challenges. The conclusion of this research is that, although efforts are in
place to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea both in Nigeria and at the regional
level, more effort is needed especially in the aspect of provision of laws at the national
level and coordination between regional initiatives.
Key Words – Enforcement, Combatting, Measures, Trends, Causes, Gaps,
Challenges, Efforts
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INTRODUCTION

Piracy is one of the most significant and direct threats to maritime security (Hassan &
Hassan, 2016). According to Murphy (2010), piracy is a slippery concept which can
rarely be applied without some form of caveat or exemption that changes its meaning.
Though not a political crime, it has often been linked to politics, state power or state
weakness. Piracy has been in existence for decades; it has taken several forms and has
been perpetuated for different reasons. The current state of piratical attacks in Nigeria
reinforces the urgency of effective law enforcement. The success of law enforcement
both at the national and regional levels depends on a sound knowledge of the
international law requirements regarding piracy and armed robbery at sea, knowledge
of the operational environment, awareness of the actors and understanding of the
nature of piracy in Nigeria and in the Gulf of Guinea (Ali, 2015).
1.1

Hypothesis

The hypothesis underlying this research is that the law enforcement against piratical
activities in Nigeria is inadequate and suffers multiple limitations.
The central issue discussed in this research is that piratical attacks in Nigeria and in
the Gulf of Guinea region have increased because of inadequate law enforcement at
the national and regional levels. The research argues that the current laws in Nigeria
do not comprehensively address the issues of piracy and armed robbery at sea. It argues
that the current regional processes have failed to yield a well-defined platform for
cooperation between states in the Gulf of Guinea region. The research demonstrates
that, although there are gaps in the international legal framework on piracy, it is
capable of working successfully to ensure acts of piracy are punished if implemented
by states.
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1.2

Aims and Objectives of the Study

The aim of this research is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the law enforcement
measures against piratical activities in Nigeria. The objective of the research is to
identify the gaps in the law enforcement and the challenges of combating piracy and
armed robbery in Nigeria.
To achieve the above objective, the dissertation will answer the following questions:
How adequate are international laws on piracy and armed robbery at sea? What are the
maritime law enforcement measures available to punish piracy and armed robbery at
sea in Nigeria and at the regional level? To what extent is Nigerian law on piracy in
conformity with international laws? How effective are the national and regional efforts
against piracy and armed robbery at sea in Nigeria? What are the gaps in law
enforcement measures against piratical activities? What are the challenges that create
the gaps in law enforcement against piracy and armed robbery at sea in Nigeria?
1.3

Research Structure

The research is divided into six chapters. Chapter one will briefly describe the concept
of piracy. It will further discuss the objectives of the research in detail, outline the
structure of the study and describe the methodology of the research.
A general overview of the trends and the nature of piracy and armed robbery at sea in
Somalia, the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria is provided in chapter two of this research.
The factors that contribute to increased piracy and armed robbery at sea are further
analysed in line with piratical activities in Nigeria.
Chapter three of this research will analyse international, regional and national legal
frameworks on piracy and armed robbery at sea, institutional frameworks and their
gaps therein. The international legal frameworks that are analysed in this dissertation
are the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas 1982 (UNCLOS), the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation 1988 (SUA Convention) and its Protocols.
International records of piracy attacks in Nigeria and in the Gulf of Guinea are
highlighted in chapter four. Records of law enforcement measures against piratical
2

attacks at the national level are critically analysed in order to evaluate and identify the
gaps in law enforcement and the challenges causing the gaps.
Chapter five summarizes the research and provides details of efforts made by Nigeria
both at the national and regional levels to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea. It
also highlights the way forward to improve maritime law enforcement in Nigeria.
Chapter six provides the conclusion of the research.
1.4

Research Methodology

To achieve the objective of this dissertation, the qualitative research method is used.
An evaluation is made regarding the current anti-piracy arrangements in Nigeria and
in the Gulf of Guinea. The research studies the nature of piracy and armed robbery at
sea along with existing legal and institutional frameworks directed towards combating
the offences. A pure legal analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of relevant
international, regional and national legal frameworks is undertaken to determine the
extent of their effectiveness. The research provides a descriptive and logical analysis
of secondary data, such as national and international organizational reports and
records, journals, previous research, existing literature, newspapers, and online
publications.
1.5

Significance of the Study

This topic was selected because of the dramatic increase in piracy in Nigeria since
2016. The dissertation is important because it provides the needed intellectual input
for understanding the difficulties faced by maritime law enforcement institutions at
national and regional levels, and how the difficulties limit their efforts to combat piracy
and armed robbery at sea.
The research also makes a unique contribution to the growing literature on maritime
law enforcement against piracy in Nigeria and it lays a foundation for further research
in this area.
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2

OVERVIEW OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA

Piracy has always been described in an unrealistic fashion by writers, filmmakers and
people who fantasize about sailing the seas of endless blue. The truth is that piracy of
today is a violent, bloody and ruthless practice and it is a major cause for concern
(Abhyankar, 2007). In the past, the deployment of multinational forces around the
Horn of Africa, particularly off the east coast of Somalia, made it seem like piracy was
a Somali problem. Just as piracy is not a new issue to shipping, it is also not a problem
of only one or two states. It is not just a Somali problem but an international affliction
on maritime trade, a global problem that requires international support and cooperation
amongst sovereign states. It exists in places like Indonesia, the South China Sea,
Malacca straits, South America and West Africa and the trends in piracy are quite
different (Baker, 2013). Modern piracy is usually carried out by a highly sophisticated
criminal organization that is equipped with fast boats and communication equipment.
These experienced criminal organizations attack and rob ships, kidnap crew and
sometimes engage in ‘phantom shipping’, which involves, taking the entire ship and
its cargo, changing the colour of the ship and obtaining fake registration documents
for the vessel which may be sold or used by the pirates for their shipping needs
(Gagain, 2010). This chapter, therefore, seeks to give an overview of the trends of
piracy and armed robbery at sea, particularly in the eastern and western parts of Africa;
the nature of piracy in Nigeria; as well as factors that contribute to increased piracy
and armed robbery at sea.
2.1

Trends of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: Somalia, Gulf of Guinea and
Nigeria

The term piracy tends to imply uniformity in the way the offence is carried out.
However, this is not the case because the behaviour and strategies of pirates throughout
the world vary. In other words, while piracy as an act remains fundamentally the same,
4

the trends in various regions are not the same (Haywood & Spivak, 2012). This section
will therefore analyse trends of piracy and armed robbery at sea in Somalia, Nigeria
and the Gulf of Guinea.
2.1.1

Somalia piracy

In Somalia, the majority of the piratical attacks occur on the high seas and are generally
carried out by persons known as foot soldiers who are mostly juveniles. The foot
soldiers are the lower level pirates that are financed by certain persons known as the
financiers. These financiers of piracy in Somalia are not involved in the acts but they
are known to exist and profit greatly from the piracy business (Hodgkinson, 2013).
Initially, Somali pirate groups were loosely organized; they had little equipment and
scant membership, but, with time, they transformed into a well-resourced efficient and
heavily armed syndicate which employs hundreds of people (Geib & Petrig, 2011).
Specific trends in Somali piracy include the geographic expansion of piracy activities,
increased cost of ransom, increased length of captivity of hostages and increased
violence towards hostages. Somali piracy developed from the use of small boats to
attack large vessels, to the hijacking of certain vessels, particularly fishing vessels. The
hijacked vessel is operated far off the coast as a mother ship to launch faster and readily
manoeuvrable smaller crafts which are used to attack large vessels, and transport
proceeds of attacks as well as hostages to the mother ship. In this way, the pirates
extend their operational range and also avoid near shore enforcements (Haywood &
Spivak, 2012). Another trend in Somali piracy is the rate at which ransom cost
increased. In 2010 – 2011 when Somalia piracy was at its peak, piratical attacks were
reported to have caused significant losses for shipping companies and boosted the sale
of kidnap and ransom policies for insurance companies (Hodgkinson, 2013). As a
result of the high ransom cost, the negotiation time also increased, thereby leaving
hostages to endure longer captivity and increased violence from pirates. In recent
years, the number of Somali piracy attacks has reduced significantly due to the law
enforcement measures carried out by international, national and regional players and,
today, the piracy problem in Africa has shifted to the west coast off Nigeria, in the
Gulf of Guinea (Baker, 2013).
5

2.1.2 Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
The Gulf of Guinea region is part of the Atlantic Ocean off the Western African Coast,
as shown in Figure 1 below. Generally, states in West Africa are referred to as the Gulf
of Guinea states, but sometimes the Gulf of Guinea is used to refer to an area that
includes several west and central African countries (Tepp, 2012).

Figure 1: Map of Gulf of Guinea

Source: Adapted from (Seidou, 2017)
The region’s geostrategic and maritime potential is quite attractive because it is
endowed with enormous mineral and marine resources. Nearly 70 percent of Africa’s
oil production is concentrated in the west coast of the Gulf of Guinea (Onuoha, 2012).
The Gulf of Guinea is also one of the most important shipping lanes in the world,
serving as free transit for international and regional trade and an alternative route for
shipping when the Suez Canal is closed. (Hassan & Hassan, 2016). Its maritime
affluence, however, coexists with many maritime afflictions, of which piracy and
armed robbery at sea is growing in nature and frequency (Onuoha, 2012). Recently,
the Gulf of Guinea has become the leading hot spot for piracy in Africa due to the
increased number of attacks within the region (Onuoha, 2013).
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has been in existence for a long time but it started
developing rapidly in the 1990’s when pirates were focused on attacking high value
assets at sea. The trend in piracy attacks in the past was more traditional because it
involved hijacking the vessel, forcing it to sail to an unknown destination where the
cargo was siphoned into the pirate’s vessel, and releasing the hijacked vessel after the
6

transfer of cargo (Tepp, 2012). Pirates were more focused on stealing ships and cargo
rather than hostage taking. In recent years, however, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has
shifted from the traditional type of piracy to a modern day piracy involving kidnapping
of the passengers and crew of ships for ransom (Hodgkinson, 2013).

2.1.3 Nigeria piracy and armed robbery at sea
Contemporary piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, is a Nigeria- centric problem. Unlike the
Somali piracy, which occurs mostly in the high seas, much of the piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea occurs in Nigerian territorial waters (Ashiru, 2016). According to KamalDeen Ali (2015), Nigeria accounts for 80 percent of reported piracy incidents in the
Gulf of Guinea and it stands out as the epicentre of Gulf of Guinea piracy.
In Nigeria, there is a complex relationship between piracy and the legacy of oil and
one could say the two issues are interwoven because piracy in Nigeria occurs mainly
in the resource rich Niger Delta region (Otto, 2014). Piracy in Nigeria started from
small scale petty robbery of personal effects of crew and ship equipment onshore, but
quickly became more organized and pirates began to operate in larger numbers and
with faster crafts. Due to the oil production and trade in the Niger Delta region, oil
theft, attacks on offshore installations as well as attacks on vessels carrying petroleum
products became bigger targets (Otto, 2014)
With the establishment of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
(MEND), piracy took a new turn in Nigerian waters and off its coast. The MEND,
according to experts, is an organized group which is a loose coalition of armed militias
who are motivated by local grievances. They were involved in kidnapping of oil
workers, theft of crude oil, raids on ships and constant attacks on installations (Watts,
2008). Their activities increased instability in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and
this in turn led to increased attacks on ships at sea, river crafts and oil platforms. Today
piracy and armed robbery attacks at sea have moved from violent armed robbery
attacks to theft of whole ships, kidnap and ransom and sometimes sabotage (Murphy,
2010).
7

2.2

Factors that Contribute to Increased Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea

The circumstances that give rise to piracy and armed robbery at sea are complex and
have many sides. There is no conclusive or universally accepted list of factors
responsible for piracy and armed robbery at sea, but some of the most consistent
factors include weak law enforcement, weak security, poverty, economic hardship and
socio-political instability. A state may not necessarily have all these factors; however,
where all or most of the factors are available, there is a likelihood for piracy to emerge
and flourish. Martin Murphy (2010) proposed seven major factors that motivate piracy,
lessen the risk of capture or detention and help protect pirates. The factors include:
legal and jurisdictional opportunities, favourable geography, conflict and disorder,
underfunded law enforcement, permissive political environment, cultural acceptability
and reward. This section will, therefore, analyse the seven factors accordingly.
2.2.1 Legal and jurisdictional opportunities
This factor exists not only in Nigeria or in Africa but across the world. Even before
the existence of international laws of the sea, piracy was a crime of universal
jurisdiction and even when pirates were regarded as enemies of all mankind, they were
subject to prosecution under domestic laws (Murphy, 2011). Today the shipping
industry is highly industrialized in the sense that a ship may have a particular
nationality, the crew may have different nationalities, and the insurance company,
different still. In such a case, finding a state that is willing to take up jurisdiction may
be difficult. The state would usually consider the fact that the evidence trail can be
easily corrupted, the need to bring witnesses from their home countries when the
proceedings commence, the cost of a trial, and the fact that chances of conviction are
often low. Issues of arrest made at sea are likely to result in persons being held longer
than the required time specified by domestic laws, thereby giving the defendants the
right to claim human rights breaches. Additionally, a person convicted for piracy may,
upon release, seek asylum in the prosecuting country, particularly in developed
nations. Due to these reasons most states may be unwilling to take up jurisdiction,
hence enforcement measures frequently end up in a catch and release situation
(Murphy, 2011).
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2.2.2 Favourable geography
Pirates consistently carry out attacks in places that they find rewarding, places with an
acceptable level of risk and places where they can easily find a place of refuge. The
most favourable location where piracy occurs is in seas that are narrowed due to the
presence of straits, bays, estuaries and archipelagos, whereby, for navigation or
commercial reasons, ships are forced to sail slowly and closer to shore (Murphy, 2010).
As a result of the slow movement of vessels in these geographic locations, it becomes
easier for pirates to board the vessels and more difficult for the vessels to take evasive
action.
Although most countries in Africa do not have these geographic conditions, some ships
sailing into Nigeria, especially tankers, are subject to similar conditions. Nigeria ranks
amongst the largest oil exporters in the world and the majority of its oil is produced in
the Niger Delta region. Due to the volatile nature of the region and constant attacks on
oil installations offshore, extracted oil is usually channelled to inshore terminals. In
order for vessels to load oil from the inshore terminals, the tankers, supply ships and
tugboats are required to navigate close to shore and sail in constrained waters. This
usually makes the vessels targets for pirates (Tepp, 2012).
2.2.3 Conflict and disorder
Piracy, like other crimes, usually thrives when there is any form of turbulence created
by violent turmoil. In regions where there are weak or non-existent governing
authorities, anarchy and predation increases and results in a wide scale of criminal
activities including piracy (Tepp, 2012). An example of such a situation is the case of
Somalia. The collapse of its central government during the war in the 1990’s, and the
resulting absence of governing authority in the coastal area, led to the rise of piracy in
the Gulf of Aden. Another example of such conflict is that between the MEND and
the Nigerian government. The MEND’s constant fight with the Nigerian government
and its declaration to attack all government facilities, personnel, vessels and
infrastructures of foreign companies paved the way for pirates who use the cloak of
insurgency to cover their predation (Tepp, 2012).
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2.2.4 Underfunded law enforcement and inadequate security
Inadequate state funding and training of law enforcement personnel is a factor that
contributes to increased piracy because many states cannot afford to employ a
considerable number of law enforcement officers, nor can they afford the equipment
required to carry out law enforcement (Murphy, 2010). Sometimes underfunding
occurs because some states give priority to land based forces, particularly the Army,
while they neglect the Navy, Air force and Coast guard. This results in ill-equipped
and underfunded maritime law enforcement agencies, thereby making them unable or
unwilling to perform their assigned responsibilities (Onuoha, 2013). A state that has
weak institutions and law enforcement due to funding of law enforcement agencies or
training of personnel may find it difficult to apprehend pirates. Even where it does
apprehend pirates, prosecuting the few arrested is less likely, and securing a conviction
may be difficult (Onuoha, 2013).
Inadequate security by shipping companies has also been identified as a contributing
factor to piracy. It is the responsibility of shipping companies to establish best
management practices to protect its ship, especially when the vessel is navigating
through piracy hotspots (Murphy, 2010). According to Murphy, the precautions could
be to assign extra watches that would lookout for possible pirate vessels in order for
the vessel to send distress calls on time. The vessel could also prime fire hoses to be
used against small crafts if they get close to the vessel. The company could also fit
secure locks to doors and install sophisticated equipment, such as high voltage fences,
to scare off pirates.
2.2.5 Permissive political environment
For piracy to thrive, it requires not just weak law enforcement, but also lax law
enforcement. Most often, the laxity of law enforcement develops as a result of
corruption of law enforcement officials or governing authorities. When this is the case,
piracy increases, especially in areas where there is insufficient security and abundant
targets (Tepp, 2012)
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2.2.6 Cultural acceptability
According to Martin Murphy (2010), piracy is most likely to have roots in areas with
a maritime tradition and skills that go with it. In areas such as Southeast Asia, piracy
may have deeper roots because important trading routes have divided the archipelagos
in the region for centuries, making piracy a way of life that has been established for
generations on a clan or family basis. An example of such maritime tradition and skills
is the Tausug communities of the Sulu archipelago, which stretches between the
southern Philippines and Borneo. In the communities, piracy was encouraged among
the men and was associated with highly regarded virtue (Murphy, 2010). While it is
possible for piracy to have roots in countries with maritime tradition and skills, this
may not be the case for some countries such as Nigeria, which has no cultural affinity
with the sea. In this case, piracy can take root in established social practices or
contemporary imperatives (Murphy, 2011). Although Nigeria does not have a culture
of piracy, the crime thrives due to social acceptance by the riverine communities of
the Niger Delta, where many of the people suffer from poverty and unemployment
because their economic activities have been affected by oil pollution (Tepp, 2012).
2.2.7 The promise of reward
No matter how great an opportunity is, it would not be exploited without the promise
of enrichment. This is evident from the Niger Delta region where the villagers of the
riverine communities are unable earn a living from small scale fishing as a result of
pollution of community waters by oil companies. The high level of unemployment and
poverty has led to the crime being perceived as a career option, especially in the
communities where pirates stand out as the richest people and role models to young
persons (Tepp, 2012).

In summary, piracy could be referred to as a crime of opportunity, a crime that would
flourish where there is low risk to pirates either because of suitable geography, a busy
seaway, conflict and disorder in a state and most of all poor counter piracy measures.
It is evident from the discussion on the nature and trends of piracy in Nigeria that the
counter-piracy measures adopted have been largely ineffective. This is premised on
11

the fact that, just as some of the factors responsible for increased piracy are present in
Nigeria, the same factors apply in Somalia. Regardless of the factors, however, piracy
has reduced off the coast of Somalia. It follows, therefore, that adequate strategies
could repel piracy regardless of the presence of certain factors which would naturally
be responsible for increased piracy. To determine the challenges faced by Nigeria in
adopting positive strategies to repel piracy and armed robbery at sea, it is important to
look into the measures in place to combat the offences. The next chapter will,
therefore, analyse the law enforcement measures available in Nigeria to combat piracy
and armed robbery at sea.
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3

LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMBATTING
PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA IN NIGERIA

In discussing the law enforcement measures available to combat piracy and armed
robbery at sea in Nigeria, this chapter will analyse the existing international, national
and regional legal frameworks and their gaps. It will further discuss the available
institutions responsible for maritime law enforcement at the national and regional
levels and their various roles in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea.
3.1

International Legal Framework

Currently the international legal framework on piracy is the UNCLOS and the
principle of customary international law finds its most lucid expression in Articles 100
-107 of UNCLOS (Ali, 2015).
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2039, in line with the Security
Council Resolution 2018 relating to the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea
in the Gulf of Guinea, reaffirms “that international law, as reflected in the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (UNCLOS) in
particular its Articles 100, 101 and 105 sets out the legal framework applicable to
countering piracy and armed robbery at sea as well as other oceans activities.” While
the UNCLOS is clear about piracy, it has nothing to say about armed robbery at sea.
As a result of this, a range of other rules have evolved from treaties drafted to address
violence at sea in various forms (Geib & Petrig, 2011).
Armed robbery at sea is not a standing legal term but a notion commonly used to
designate activities that occur in a state’s territorial sea. In 1986, the Council of the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) decided that armed robbery at sea required
its urgent attention; therefore, in order not to delay, it set up an Ad Hoc committee
which was opened to all states to prepare, on priority basis, a draft convention. The
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committee agreed on a draft convention in 1987 and in 1988 the SUA Convention was
adopted by a diplomatic conference convened in Rome (Geib & Petrig, 2011). The
Convention did not specifically define armed robbery at sea but it is a treaty which
deals with violent acts against ships and persons on board (Murphy, 2007); hence, its
provisions cover any violent acts at sea which could be piracy or armed robbery at sea.
In discussing the international legal framework, this section will focus on UNCLOS,
particularly the requirements in Articles 100, 101 and 105, and the SUA frameworks.
3.1.1 The requirement of the UNCLOS
Article 100 UNCLOS provides for a general obligation of states to cooperate in the
repression of piracy when encountered at the high seas or in any other place outside
the jurisdiction of a state. This duty to cooperate is the first provision on piracy in
UNCLOS and it provides an appropriate benchmark as a framework for the substantive
provisions that follow. The provision serves as a guiding principle in identifying the
specific obligation imposed on states. An example of the obligation on states to
cooperate is the duty to share relevant information that can help prevent piracy attacks
and facilitate prosecution of suspected pirates. For emphasis on the importance of
cooperation, Article 100 UNCLOS expressly provides that all states shall cooperate
‘‘to the fullest possible extent’’ (Gottelieb, 2013)
While states have the obligation to cooperate in repressing piracy, a state must first
ascertain what constitutes the act of piracy in order to effectively combat the offence.
The definition of piracy can be found in Article 101 UNCLOS which provides that
piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a)

‘Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,

committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a
private aircraft, and directed:
(i) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft;
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(ii) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any state;
(b)

Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an

aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate-ship or aircraft;
(c)

Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in

subparagraph (a) or (b).’
The above definition appears simple and straightforward at first glance; however,
when it is examined closely it becomes clear that the wording contains certain complex
requirements which must be carried out for an act to be referred to as piracy (Ali,
2015). Identifying these requirements to determine what constitutes piracy and what
does not is the first major step to combatting piracy. Article 101 of UNCLOS demands
that for an act to be deemed as piratical, it must have the following features;
3.1.1.1 The acts of piracy must be committed on the high seas
This requirement is fundamental to the exercise of jurisdiction over piracy because it
has to do with the place of offence. The UNCLOS definition limits piracy to acts that
occur on the high seas or a place outside the jurisdiction of any state. In line with
articles 55, 58 and 88- 115 of the UNCLOS, the high seas in this context include all
waters beyond the territorial sea of a state, such as the contiguous zone and the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ). This means that acts of violence against ships in
territorial waters or internal waters of a state are not regarded as piracy under
international law (Ali, 2015).
3.1.1.2 The violent acts must be solely for private ends
Another issue which seems to be a very complex requirement of the crime is that the
act must be committed for ‘‘private ends”. From this requirement, piracy may be
motivated as a result of hatred or revenge; however, politically motivated acts cannot
be said to fall under the international law definition of piracy (UNCTAD, 2014). This
requirement tends to be very problematic, especially because of the need to prove the
private motive of a crime. It restricts the scope of piracy such that a person may escape
conviction if it can be proved that the acts were committed for public ends (Ali, 2015).
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This feature shifts the definition of piracy away from acts which are political in nature,
thus setting aside acts of insurgency and terrorism which are major problems in
Nigeria, especially in the Niger delta where the militants are seen to engage in piratical
activities in order to increase their influence and funding (Best, 2015).
3.1.1.3 The act must have involved two vessels
The third requirement provided by Article 101 of the UNCLOS is that, for an act to be
called piracy, more than one vessel must be involved. This means that the act must be
committed by the crew or passengers of a private ship against another ship. Under this
requirement, attacks against some platforms at sea, or internal hijack of vessels by
ship’s crew, resulting in kidnap and ransom cases, do not fall under the UNCLOS
definition of piracy (UNCTAD, 2014).
On one hand, it is important to understand what constitutes the offence of piracy;
however, understanding what constitutes piracy is not sufficient enough to counter the
offence. Enforcement measures are key to combatting piracy and for a state to enforce
its laws on suspected pirates, it needs to understand the jurisdictional aspect of the
offence in order to criminalize it.
International law regards piracy as universally cognizable; hence, any nation could try
pirates it has caught regardless of the location on the high seas in which they were
apprehended, or the nationality of the pirates (Kontorovich, 2004). Article 105
UNCLOS places a universal jurisdiction on states and authorizes all states to take
enforcement measures against pirate ships or ships taken by piracy and under the
control of pirates. This right is an exception to the exclusivity of a flag state’s
jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag as provided for in Articles 92 and 94 of the
UNCLOS (Geib & Petrig, 2011). Since piracy provides an independent basis for
jurisdiction under international law, there need not be any jurisdictional link between
the state exercising jurisdiction and the suspected pirates. By Article 105, states can
criminalize piracy in their national legislation and set out relevant sentences for those
convicted of piracy (UNCTAD, 2014). Thus, pirates may be prosecuted by the legal
system of any state regardless of the flag of the vessel attacked, the flag of the vessel
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used to commit the offence or the nationality of the pirates (Ali, 2015). In practice,
however, a state may be reluctant in taking counter-piracy measures as a result of
certain constraints which may include logistics or inadequacy of the domestic legal
framework to prosecute the offence (Ali, 2015). As a result, pirates may use this to
their own advantage by moving between jurisdictions to avoid capture, bearing in mind
the states that give priority to the suppression of the offence and the resources they
allocate to it (Murphy, 2007)
3.1.2 The SUA framework
The SUA framework originated as a result of the hijack of the Achille Lauro in 1985.
The Achille Lauro was an Italian cruise ship which was hijacked by an armed group
who claimed to be members of the Palestinian Liberation Front. The group held the
passengers and crew of the ship hostage and demanded the release of 50 Palestinians
that were in prison in Israel. The hijacked ship had passengers and crew from different
nationalities; hence, there was a need for the states to cooperate. Cooperation failed
and, as a result of this, each government tried to solve the case separately. The problem
with the case was that it was not regarded as piracy because the armed group who
hijacked the vessel hid illegally within the ship and, after the hijack, they made
political demands. For these reasons, their act could not be brought under Article 101
of the UNCLOS (Monji, 2014).
This incident revealed some important gaps in the piracy rules contained in the
UNCLOS; therefore, it necessitated the adoption of the SUA Convention (Geib &
Petrig, 2011). The purpose of the convention was to ensure that there is an instrument
which would fill the gaps in international law relating to illegal acts against merchant
shipping. Therefore, the convention was made applicable to any act that could have an
adverse effect on the safety of navigation at sea whether or not such acts falls within
the definition of piracy under conventional or customary law of the sea (Mensah,
2011).
Article 3 of the convention prohibits attacks on ships and attempted attacks. It provides
for a long list of unlawful acts that threaten the safety of maritime navigation without
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specifically mentioning piracy or armed robbery at sea; however, the offences listed
in the provision may be fulfilled by pirates and armed robbers at sea (Geib & Petrig,
2011).
Pursuant to Article 3, a prohibited offence is an act by anyone who unlawfully or
intentionally:
(a)

‘‘seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat or any other form of

intimidation; or
(b)

performs any act of violence against any person on board a ship if the act is

likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship.’’
Unlawful acts in the above provision could be piracy or armed robbery at sea and such
acts constitute an offence whether or not it comes from within or outside the ship or
regardless of the motive of the actors (Ali, 2015). This Article is aimed towards
ensuring that politically motivated attacks could be prosecuted by states (Dutton,
2012). An important feature of the SUA Convention is its uniqueness in defining
offences and the requirement for states to provide penalties according to the severity
of the offence. Article 5 provides that state parties must appropriate penalties for
enumerated offences according to the gravity of each offence. This, therefore, means
that states must ensure that, in their national laws, the sanction is adequate for the
offence (Mukherjee, 2002).
Another requirement of the SUA Convention is the extended geographical jurisdiction
available to state parties against unlawful acts. Unlike the UNCLOS, which limits
piracy to the high seas, by Article 4 of the SUA Convention, states parties have the
right to prosecute acts of piracy carried out on a ship navigating or scheduled to
navigate to or from the territorial waters of a state (Geib & Petrig, 2011).
In addition to extended geographical jurisdiction, the SUA Convention gives state
parties jurisdiction over acts of piracy. Article 6 of the Convention provides for ‘‘state
parties’’ to take necessary measures to establish jurisdiction over unlawful acts when
the offence is committed against a ship flying its flag or, the offence occurred in its
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territory or, the offence was committed by its national or, the national of the state was
a victim of the offence or, the offence was committed by a stateless person whose
habitual residence is in the state or, the offence was committed in attempt to compel
the state to do or abstain from doing an act. Unlike the UNCLOS, universal jurisdiction
is not exercise over acts of piracy under the SUA Convention and only signatories to
the convention may prosecute violations of the convention, but they would require
some form of connection to the offence as provided in Article 6, in order to prosecute
piracy or armed robbery at sea (Dutton, 2012).
The SUA convention also imposes a strong requirement on state parties to cooperate.
In line with Article 7 of the Convention, state parties are granted the right to take into
custody suspected pirates or armed robbers at sea arrested in their territory regardless
of whether the state wants to prosecute the offender or not. The state is required to
extradite the suspect to a state that makes an extradition request either by using an
existing extradition treaty or by using the convention as the basis of the extradition.
However, where the state fails to extradite, it is mandated without exception to
prosecute the suspected pirate (Ali, 2015).
The SUA Convention was adopted together with the Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf
1988 (1988 SUA Protocol). The 1988 SUA Protocol was adopted because, it was
thought that unlawful acts at sea were not limited to ships but also applicable to
offshore installations (Kaye, 2007). The Protocol focused on the safety and security of
platforms attached to the seabed and it applies to artificial islands, installations and
structures engaged in exploration and exploitation of the seabed, or engaged in other
economic purpose. The offences under the 1988 SUA Protocol include seizure or
taking control of fixed platforms, threatening the safety of the platform and causing
injury or death to persons on board fixed platforms (Kaye, 2007). Although the SUA
Convention and Protocol of 1988 were far reaching in terms of unlawful acts at sea,
there were still concerns that the two instruments were not all encompassing. The
terrorist attack against the United States on 11 September 2011 increased the concern
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that ships could be hijacked and used as weapons against other ships, and thus the
international response to address the issue was the adoption in 2005 of two new
Protocols to the 1988 SUA Convention and the 1988 SUA protocol. The instruments
are: The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Fixed Platforms. These protocols extended the scope of offences to include acts
which cause serious injury or damage by use of any kind of explosives, biological,
chemical, nuclear or radioactive materials (Ali, 2015).
Although the SUA Convention and Protocols remedy some of the gaps in the
UNCLOS provision on piracy, it is not without shortcomings. It is argued that the
requirement of jurisdictional link between alleged offenders and state parties
prosecuting them seriously undermines the notion of universal jurisdiction applicable
to piracy offences and that some of the provisions of the Convention may allow
suspected offenders to escape punishment. Particularly, reference has been made to
Article 11 of the Convention that it fails to impose real obligation to prosecute and
punish offenders (Hasan, 2014). It is also argued that the obligation to extradite using
the convention as a legal basis or any specific treaty is not absolute and may be
frustrated by political will (Hasan, 2014).
Like the UNCLOS, the SUA Convention and its Protocols have the potential to be a
useful instrument in fighting piratical activities. Its application largely depends on how
states applies its provisions.
3.2

National Legal Framework on Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea

To combat piracy and armed robbery at sea, the UNCLOS and SUA Conventions rely
heavily on corresponding domestic laws. Both the UNCLOS and SUA Conventions
require States to take appropriate measures to combat the offence. This means that
mere ratification of the conventions is not sufficient for a state party to effectively
suppress the offence. The most important task for state parties to these conventions is
to incorporate the rights and obligations provided by the conventions into their national
legal and policy frameworks (Ali, 2015).
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Despite the relevance of the SUA Framework, especially in Nigeria where most of the
attacks are in territorial waters and often against offshore platforms, the 2005 SUA
Protocol is yet to be ratified by Nigeria. Therefore, for acts of piracy and armed robbery
at sea, the UNCLOS, and the 1988 SUA Convention, and SUA Protocol are the
international treaties Nigeria is bound to follow having ratified the UNCLOS in 1986
(United Nations, 2017), the SUA Convention in 2004 and the SUA Protocol in 2015
(IMO, 2017).
In Nigeria, there is no any anti- piracy law that criminalizes piracy or armed robbery
at sea and there is also no national law which specifically incorporates the provisions
of UNCLOS and the SUA Convention and Protocol. There is a rather vague provision
in Part XII of the Merchant Shipping Act Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN)
2007 (LFN, 2016) which deals with safety of life at sea (See Appendix 1).
Article 216 (h) of the Merchant Shipping Act provides that “As from the
commencement of this Act, the following Conventions, Protocol and their
amendments relating to maritime safety shall apply that is; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 and the
Protocol thereto.”
Article 217 (1) of the Act further provides that ‘‘The Minister may make such
regulations as he deems expedient for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the
part of this Act.’’
The Merchant Shipping Act only provided that the 1988 SUA Convention and Protocol
would apply to maritime safety, but it failed to provide for adequate punishment for
offences under the Convention and the Protocol. It could be that the intention of the
drafters of the Merchant Shipping Act was to give effect to the convention; however,
mere mention of the instruments in the Act defeats the purpose for which the
instruments were created. As earlier mentioned in this research, the SUA framework
identifies different unlawful acts at sea which can be prosecuted by states but it places
an obligation on state parties to provide appropriate sentences for the offences in their
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domestic laws. Mere mention of the SUA Convention and Protocol in the Merchant
Shipping Act only means the offences are recognized but without punishment.
Although there are no specific laws criminalizing piracy and armed robbery in Nigeria,
there are some laws such as the Criminal Code Act and the Penal Code (LFN, 2016)
that criminalize the constituent components of piracy and armed robbery at sea;
however, they apply only to offences carried out in Nigeria’s territory and territorial
waters.
3.3

Regional Legal Framework

Article 100 UNCLOS provides for two interrelated obligations in respect of piracy.
The first obligation is for states to repress piracy at the national level. The second
obligation is for states to cooperate in the repression of piracy at the regional and
international levels. To give practical effect to the second obligation, there is a need to
establish legal frameworks that would facilitate information sharing and strategies to
combat piracy (Ali, 2015). The Economic Community for West African States
(ECOWAS) Treaty of 1975 is the first legal framework adopted at the regional level
to foster cooperation. The treaty was revised in 1992 to deepen the security objective
and was further adopted in 1999, establishing peace and security mechanisms for
ECOWAS (Ali, 2014). Article 58 of the ECOWAS revised treaty requires states to
undertake to work, safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to maintain peace,
stability and security in the region. As a result of this, Nigeria and Benin entered into
a Bilateral Agreement, codename Operation Prosperity, concerning border
management in 2011 and this bilateral agreement resulted in cooperation between
security forces of both countries and led to joint anti-piracy patrols along their common
sea borders (Blum, 2014). So far as piracy and armed robbery at sea are concerned, the
only output from ECOWAS is the bilateral agreement between Nigeria and Benin. As
a result of this, in 2013, the Heads of States and Government of ECOWAS directed
the ECOWAS commission to facilitate and adopt an ECOWAS maritime strategy and
to establish a Pilot Zone E, which will be a regional maritime framework to suppress
piracy within the region (Onuoha, 2013).
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The Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) Memorandum of
Understanding for the Establishment of Sub-Regional Integrated Coast Guard
Network in West and Central Africa, MOWCA/XII GA.08/8.2008 referred to as the
MOWCA Coastguard MOU is another regional legal framework available in the Gulf
of Guinea (MOWCA, 2008). The MOU was aimed at using a unified administration
to create a maritime law enforcement program and to create a regional maritime
information sharing centre to help member states share and exchange security
information (Ali, 2014). Article 12 of the MOU divides the coast guard network into
zones. The MOU provides for a principal coordinator that is responsible for the
management of the coast guard network and zonal coordinators responsible for the
zones. Article 15 of the MOU established rules for operation of the coast guard asset
and Article 21 requires states seeking the presence of ships in their zone to request
‘‘useful justification’’ by the zonal coordinators that would approve the request and
plan the mission (Ali, 2014). To date, the MOU is yet to gain full commitment in
respect to the coast guard functions; however, it succeeded in ensuring that member
states establish national Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCC) (Jacobsen &
Nordby, 2015).
The Treaty of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) 2001 also provides a legal
framework at the regional level. For maritime security issues, it is aimed at
strengthening cooperation amongst member states and among other regional
institutions. It is also aimed at creating conditions of mutual confidence, conducive to
peace and security of states (GGC, 2017).
In 2013, the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery
against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activity in the West and Central Africa (Yaoundé
Code of conduct) was adopted and signed by 22 states in the region. The Yaoundé
Code of conduct came into existence as a result of the United Nation Security Council
Resolutions 2018 and 2039 which encouraged ECOWAS, the Economic Community
for Central African States (ECCAS) and the GGC to develop a comprehensive regional
strategy and framework to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships and other
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illicit maritime activities through regional information sharing and strategic
coordination mechanism. It was adopted to build on the MOU on integrated coast
guard functions and it incorporates a number of elements of the Djibouti code of
conduct, which is the regional counter-piracy agreement for East African states. The
Yaoundé Code has a wider scope than the Djibouti code and it addresses a range of
illicit activities at sea including piracy (IMO, 2017). To date, the code is yet to be
implemented (Mosima, 2017).
3.4

Institutional Framework

Laws have force when there are enforcement mechanisms to achieve the purpose for
which they are made. This means that the mere existence of legal instruments to
combat acts of piracy cannot help in suppressing the offence. This section will examine
the institutions available to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea at national and
regional levels.
3.4.1

National institutional frameworks

The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), the Nigerian
Navy, the Federal Ministry of Justice, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), and the
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) are the agencies responsible for
law enforcement against piracy and armed robbery at sea in Nigeria.
NIMASA is the maritime administration agency established by the Nigerian Maritime
Administration and Safety Agency Act (2007). By virtue of the Act, one of the core
functions of NIMASA is to implement domesticated international maritime
conventions. With respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea, NIMASA’s role is to
carry out air and coastal surveillance, search and rescue operations and to supervise
general maritime logistic support for patrols against piracy and armed robbery in
Nigerian coastal waters (NIMASA, 2017).
The Nigerian Navy is the agency empowered by the Nigerian Constitution to protect
the territorial waters of the state and to secure the state’s maritime zones. This policing
role is spelt out in section 4 of the Armed Forces Act (AFA) CAP A20 LFN 2004,
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which requires the Nigerian Navy to enforce, assist and coordinate the enforcement of
national and international maritime laws ratified by Nigeria (AFA, 2004).
Accordingly, the Nigerian Navy’s role against piratical acts is to make arrests of pirate
vessels, suspected pirates and armed robbers at sea (Nigerian Navy, 2014).
The NPF also has a department of marine police which has formations in areas where
there are navigable rivers and waterways in Nigeria. The marine police department
generally conducts security combats and anti-crime operations in territorial waters but
focuses more on securing platforms (NPF, 2017).
The Federal Ministry of Justice and the EFCC carry out public prosecution. While the
main function of the Federal Ministry of Justice is to prosecute all types of criminal
cases (Federal Ministry of Justice, 2017), the EFCC’s role is to prosecute economic
and financial crimes (EFCC, 2017). In line with section 5(m) of the Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission Act, the EFCC is responsible for ‘‘taking charge of,
supervising, controlling, co-ordinating all the responsible functions and activities
relating to the current investigation and prosecution of all offences connected with or
relating to economic and financial crime.’’ Although piracy and armed robbery at sea
are not specifically listed as offences under the Act, in practice, the EFCC handles
cases of piracy and armed robbery at sea.
3.4.2 Regional institutional frameworks
In West Africa, the institutional frameworks created to strengthen maritime security
and increase cooperation amongst states in the region are MOWCA, ECOWAS, GGC
and ECCAS (Ali, 2015). Most countries in West and Central African regions are
members of these institutions and they commit to cooperating in the prevention of
different maritime security threats, including piracy and armed robbery at sea (Otto,
2014). Nigeria is a member of MOWCA, ECOWAS and GGC.
MOWCA was established in 1975 and its major objective is to ‘‘serve the regional and
international community for handling all maritime matters that are regional in
character.’’ MOWCA has 25 member states and they form the member states of the
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Gulf of Guinea region (Ali, 2015). MOWCA could be regarded as a regional maritime
institution that establishes contacts and negotiates between private maritime sectors,
national ports, maritime authorities and educational bodies (Jacobsen & Nordby,
2015).
ECOWAS was established in 1975 and it has 15 member states out of the 25 states in
the Gulf of Guinea. ECOWAS was adopted mainly for economic cooperation amongst
member states; however, its revised treaty expanded its political and security objective
by establishing a peace and security mechanism (Ali, 2014).
The GGC was established in 2001 with an objective to stand as “a permanent
institutional framework for co-operation amongst the countries bordering the Gulf of
Guinea in order to defend their common interest and promote peace and social
economic development based on dialogue, consensus, ties of friendship, solidarity and
fraternity’’ (GGC, 2017). The GGC is the only regional organization in the Gulf of
Guinea that is entirely maritime and, for this reason, it has gained international
attention as an organization that has the ability to enlist national regional and external
assistance to develop a robust maritime security cooperation and enforcement
framework regardless of the size of the organization (Ali, 2015).
ECCAS is another regional institution serving the Gulf of Guinea region but Nigeria
is not a member. It was established in 1983 but became operational in 1999 due to
financial difficulties and interstate conflict in the region. In 2008, ECCAS developed
an Integrated Strategy for Maritime Security (ISMS) which was aimed towards
developing a common regional framework that would regulate maritime activities in
Central Africa. It adopted a Protocol on Maritime Security (protocol on the peace and
security council of central Africa (COPAX) in 2009 which laid down the structure of
its maritime security cooperation. The Protocol set out a 3 tier security structure which
is composed of regional, zonal and national coordinating centres (ECCAS ,2014). Its
Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) was activated
due to the security structure and the CRESMAC was responsible for commanding
three centres of multinational coordination. The aim of the CRESMAC was to bridge
26

the information sharing and authorization protocols required during hot pursuit of
suspected vessels across maritime boundaries (Osinowo, 2015). ECCAS derived the
legal and political authority as an institutional framework for cooperation by states
within the region.

The international legal framework examined in this chapter provides the normative
regime for responding to piracy and armed robbery at sea. the discussion identified
certain gaps in the international legal framework but was able to demonstrate that the
UNCLOS and SUA conventions complement each other to fill the gaps. Although it
may be argued that the international frameworks do not provide sufficient solutions to
piratical activities, they are capable of working successfully to ensure piracy and
armed robbery are punished if implemented by states.
In the fight against piracy, the utility of the international legal framework depends on
its implementation in piracy affected regions. The usefulness of the international legal
frameworks in Nigeria is limited due to its failure to implement the conventions.
Failure to incorporate and implement the Conventions means inadequate laws to
establish jurisdiction to prosecute the offence and inadequate laws to punish the
offence. This also constitutes serious a impediment on the maritime law enforcement
institutions in the performance of their roles.
According to Ali (2015), one of the ways to minimize legal complexities is through
commitment to regional and global cooperation. The discussion in this chapter showed
that there are a number of regional institutions which Nigeria is part of. Despite their
existence, their efforts so far have proved insufficient to deter piracy because of certain
limitations. Some of these limitations include differences in cooperative agenda,
sovereignty limitations, financial limitations, and internal politics in the organization.
Since the majority of piratical attacks occur within territorial waters, the logical
response to the threat would be to strengthen law enforcement and enhance
cooperation between the regional organizations. The next chapter will, therefore, look
into the challenges of combating piracy in Nigeria with a view to proffering solutions.
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4

CHALLENGES OF COMBATTING PIRACY IN NIGERIA

The purpose of this chapter is to pinpoint the areas where there are gaps that limit the
fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea, and to identify the major challenges
causing the gaps. To achieve this, this chapter will give details of international reports
on piracy and armed robbery against ships in Nigeria and in the Gulf of Guinea region,
followed by records from Nigerian law enforcement agencies which show statistics of
law enforcement measures. It will further analyse the contemporary challenges of
combatting piracy and armed robbery at sea in Nigeria. The period covered by this
study will be from 2013 to 2016 because in this period, Nigeria recorded the highest
number of attacks in Africa.
4.1

Records of Piratical Activities in Nigeria from 2013-2016

The aim of this section is to show the rising level of piracy and armed robbery attacks
against ships navigating through Nigerian maritime zones, to show the enforcement
measures by the relevant agencies and to identify the areas where there are gaps in the
enforcement measures.
4.1.1 Reports from international organizations
The International Maritime Organization is a specialized agency of the UN responsible
for maritime safety, maritime security, facilitation of international maritime transport
and protection of the marine environment. The IMO receives reports of actual and
attempted attacks of piracy and armed robbery at sea from member states and relevant
regional international organizations and it provides incident reports monthly and
annually through its Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) (IMO,
2017). Table 1 below, which was adapted from IMO monthly and annual reports on
piracy and armed Robbery against ships, shows that from 2013 to 2016, Nigeria
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recorded a substantial number of attacks and attempted attacks when compared to the
total global attacks in each year.
Table 1: IMO incident report on actual and attempted piracy attacks
INCIDENT REPORTS
IMO Annual report for West Africa
on attacks and attempted attacks
Annual reported attacks and
attempted attacks in Nigeria
Source: Adapted from (IMO, 2017)

2013

2014

2015

2016

54

45

35

62

28

20

11

32

The ICC IMB piracy reporting centre is another international forum which provides
transparent statistics on piracy and armed robbery attacks. The Piracy Reporting
Centre was established in 1992 to act as a single point of contact for shipmasters to
report piracy and armed robbery attacks or suspected attacks anywhere in the world.
Usually, as soon as the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre receives information from the
shipmasters, it relays the information to the local law enforcement agencies for
assistance to be rendered to the vessel, and then broadcasts the information to all
vessels in the region to create awareness (IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, 2017). The
information reported by shipmasters on piracy and armed robbery attacks is collated
and published annually by the IMB. Table 2 shows actual and attempted piracy and
armed robbery attacks in Nigeria.
Table 2: IMB report on actual and attempted piracy attacks
LOCATION

2013

2014

2015

2016

NIGERIA

31

18

14

36

Source: Adapted from (IMB Piracy reporting Centre, 2017).
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The IMB annual report of 2016 also shows an increased number of piratical attacks in
Nigeria. In the report, the pirates and armed robbers were described to be fully armed
and violent, famous for robbing and hijacking vessels, and sometimes kidnapping the
crew (ICC IMB, 2017). Figure 2 shows recent IMB statistics on five countries which
account for 63% of the total global reported piracy attacks and attempted attacks in
2016
Figure 2: Top five piracy locations in 2016
PHILIPPINES, 10
PERU, 11

NIGERIA, 36

INDIA, 14

INDONESIA, 49

Source: Adapted from (IMB Piracy reporting Centre, 2017).

Whereas the statistics from the IMO or IMB may not be totally accurate, as there have
been known cases of under reporting of less serious attacks for a variety of reasons,
they are a useful indicator of general trends (Trelawny, 2013). From the above tables
and chart, it is clear that reported cases of piratical attacks in Nigeria increased in 2016.
A study of the statistics reveals some interesting facts. For example, the number of
piratical attacks, both actual and attempted, dropped in 2014 and 2015. Compared to
2016, Nigeria reported 36 attacks out of 191 reported attacks representing
approximately 19% of the total global reported attacks in 2016.
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4.1.2 Reports from law enforcement agencies in Nigeria
This section shows reports of piracy and armed robbery from law enforcement
agencies in Nigeria according to their specific roles highlighted in chapter three of this
research.
Table 3: NIMASA report on piracy distress calls
S/N

YEAR

PIRACY

SEA

ATTEMPTED

SUSPICIOUS

TOTAL

ATTACK

ROBBERY

ATTACK

ATTACK

ATTACK

5

112

1.

2013

81

10

16

2.

2014

11

1

5

17

3.

2015

10

3

13

4.

2016

8

1

1

10

Source: Adapted from (Ibraheemarfo@gmail.com, Personal communication, May 26,
2017).
Table 3 was generated from NIMASA records on distress calls received from ships.
The full report which is attached in Appendix 2 did not capture the actual actions taken
by NIMASA with respect to their support patrol and search and rescue duties, but it
showed a declining number of distress calls to NIMASA on piracy and armed robbery
attacks from 2013 to 2016. The figures from NIMASA, however, do not tally with
those of the Nigerian Navy shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Nigerian Navy report on piracy attacks and attempted attacks
S/N

YEAR

CARGO
VESSEL

1
2.
3.
4.
5.

2013
2014
2015
2016

3
3
16

TANKER
VESSEL

16
12
37

OTHER
VESSEL

8
2
25
TOTAL

TOTAL
ATTACKS

27
17
78
122

SUSPECTED PERSONS
ARRESTED FOR
PIRACY AND ARMED
ROBBERY

26
24
26
11
87

Source: Adapted from (Apache58us@yahoo.com, Personal communication, June 17,
2017).
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Table 4 was generated from the Nigerian Navy operations records. See Appendix 3 –
6 of this research for the full report which shows the list of attacks on vessels in
Nigerian waters from 2014 to 2016 and the list of vessels and crew arrested for piracy
and armed robbery. The report shows that in 2016 the Nigerian Navy recorded a higher
number of attacks than that recorded by the IMB piracy reporting centre. Moreover,
the reports highlighted a total number of 122 attacks from 2013 to 2016 and, in same
period, a total of 87 persons were arrested and handed over for prosecution.
From the Nigerian Navy record of attacks in 2016, it becomes evident that the Nigerian
Navy received direct calls for assistance from vessels under attack, but the majority of
the calls received were not reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre.

Table 5: Piracy cases prosecuted by the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Justice and
EFCC
S/N

YEAR

1.
2.
3.
4.

2013
2014
2015
2016

NUMBER OF
SUSPECT
BROUGHT TO
COURT

CONVICTIONS

DISCHARGED
AND
ACQUITTED

ONGOING
CASES

3
2
1
6
2
1
3
4
3
1
Total - 13
Source: Adapted from (Kehinde, Personal communication, May 25, 2017)
Table 5, which shows piracy cases handled by prosecuting agencies in Nigeria, was
received from the Department of Public Prosecution, a unit in the Nigerian Federal
Ministry of Justice. The record shows a total number of 13 cases handled from 2013
to2016, with three convictions and one discharge and acquittal of arrested persons.
Compared to the number of handovers made by the arresting agency, the cases that
were successfully brought before the court are surprisingly very low.
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4.2

Gaps in the Law Enforcement Measures

From the records provided in section 4.1.2 above, certain gaps are visible when the
figures provided by the law enforcement agencies are analysed. The first gap is lack
of cooperation and poor information sharing between law enforcement agencies. In
2007, NIMASA and the Nigerian Navy entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) to enable the two agencies to cooperate in securing the country’s maritime
domain. The MOU created an avenue for both agencies to collaborate on surveillance
of the coastal waters, information sharing, search and rescue operations and sea-based
enforcement actions against piracy, armed robbery and other maritime offences
(NIMASA, 2017). This MOU gave rise to the use of the Nigerian Navy satellite
surveillance system (FALCON EYE) by NIMASA to enhanced information sharing
and reduce response time (Kajo, 2016). Considering the collaboration between the two
agencies, it is expected that there would be an enhanced information sharing system
between the agencies; however, this is not the case. To have different records on
piratical activities shows that there is a gap in the information sharing system and in
cooperation between the agencies.
The records on piracy and armed robbery at sea by the Nigerian Navy, attached as
Appendix 3-6 of this research, show a high number of successful attacks by pirates
and sea robbers within and outside the territorial waters of Nigeria, in which some of
the crew or passengers were killed or taken hostage before the attacked vessels were
secured by the law enforcement agency. There is an obvious gap in the response time
to repel piracy attacks on vessels by the Nigerian Navy and NIMASA.
The prosecuting agencies are not left out. While records show a number of 87 arrested
persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery attacks, only 13 persons made it to
court. When compared to the number of arrests made by the Nigerian Navy, the actual
number of piracy or armed robbery cases brought to court is very low. This is an
indication that there is a gap or some gaps that hinder the prosecuting agencies from
charging in court every person arrested for suspected piracy or armed robbery at sea.
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4.3

Challenges Hindering Effective Law Enforcement against Piracy and
Armed Robbery at Sea in Nigeria

Efforts to repress piracy are generally hindered by a number of factors which could be
legal, economic, financial or political challenges at national and regional levels. In
Nigeria, the challenges are numerous and they create gaps in law enforcement
measures. This section, therefore, seeks to examine the challenges of combating piracy
in Nigeria and off its coast.
4.3.1 Domestication of international laws
Despite the codification of universal jurisdiction and the push for regional cooperation
to combat piracy, customary international law still requires domestic legislation to
prosecute the crime (Chang, 2010). In Nigeria, the mode for domestication of
international treaties is provided for in the constitution. Section 12(1) of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 provides that; ‘‘No treaty
between the federation and other country shall have the force of law except to the
extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly.’’
In other words, before any treaty such as the UNCLOS and SUA conventions can have
the force of law in Nigeria, the Nigerian National Assembly must enact the treaty into
law. As earlier mentioned in this research, Nigeria has yet to domesticate these
conventions into national law. Since the conventions are not domesticated, they cannot
be used in the prosecution of cases involving piracy and armed robbery at sea before
any court of law in Nigeria, nor can violators of the conventions be held accountable
for any breach (Rotimi, 2016). Due to the legislative deficit, even though Nigeria may
be able to conduct patrols and make arrests of suspected persons, the efficacy of its
enforcement procedure is seriously undermined by the absence of domestic legislation
to prosecute the offence of piracy and armed robbery at sea (see page 21).
In some cases, the prosecuting agency finds it difficult to charge the suspected pirates
in court because there is no appropriate offence under the national law to charge the
persons involved. This is likely to result in catch and release situations, thereby giving
a free pass to the suspected persons to continue their acts (Ali 2015).
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From the above points, it could be concluded that the inability of Nigeria to enact
specific laws on piracy and armed robbery at sea is a contributing factor to the limited
number of piracy related trials in national courts. Situations whereby suspected pirates
are released without trial may have little deterrent effect on other potential pirates and
this has an effect on law enforcement agencies’ power to effectively combat the
offence.
4.3.2 Enforcement capacity
For effective law enforcement against piratical activities, there needs to be a robust
capacity with respect to surveillance, response and enforcement (Osinowo, 2015). In
Nigeria, surveillance has improved tremendously due to the existence of the FALCON
EYE surveillance system which monitors the Nigerian maritime zones up to 200nm
(Wertheim, 2017). However, the vessels available for use by the Nigerian Navy and
NIMASA for patrols and rescue duties are inadequate (Salau, 2017). This has a major
effect on response time to distress calls on piracy attacks and also on other enforcement
measures such as in situations of hot pursuit of a vessel involved in piracy. From
personal experience, the usual trend when there is hot pursuit of such pirate vessels is
for the vessels to be navigated into creeks and areas where most Nigerian navy vessels
cannot navigate. The Nigerian Navy finds it very difficult to navigate into such creeks
because the vessels it deploys for the operations are not built for such waters. Most
times, local pilots are employed for patrol operations to ensure the vessels are
navigated through the right channels.
Another issue related to inadequate law enforcement capacity that hinders the fight
against piracy is a lack of skilled personnel. While arrest of persons involved in piracy
activities is one aspect of law enforcement, the judicial process is another aspect.
Therefore, to successfully prosecute an arrested person, there must be admissible
evidence against the person charged before the court. Most often, the preservation of
evidence by the arresting agency before handover to the prosecuting agency is a
problem. During the period of investigations before handover, there is usually the
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challenge of preservation of evidence which weighs in favour of the arrested persons,
who in turn use it as grounds to gain freedom (Osinowo, 2015).
4.3.3 Lack of power to prosecute
In Nigeria, the Navy relies on the EFCC and the Ministry of Justice to prosecute
persons arrested on suspicion of piracy and armed robbery at sea because it lacks the
power to prosecute such persons. This is a major obstacle in the fight against piracy
and armed robbery at sea, especially in respect of availability of judicial officials. An
example is the case of the Niger Delta area where trials of the arrested persons come
several months after the arrest due to insufficient availability of judicial officers. As a
result of the wait time, the suspected persons institute numerous cases of human rights
breaches in courts because they were in detention longer than the required period
provided by law. This usually weighs in favour of the suspected persons, who regain
freedom soon after arrest (Osinowo, 2015).
4.3.4 Corruption
Another challenge that hinders law enforcement against piracy and armed robbery at
sea in Nigeria is corruption of security operatives and government officials. There have
been allegations of law enforcement officials collaborating with pirates and some
arrested pirates have revealed that politicians, traditional rulers and corporate interest
groups are sponsors of piracy in Nigeria. Hence, most of the pirate kingpins who are
known to security operatives are untouchable by the law and even when they are
arrested, they are usually released based on orders from top government officials
(Oyewole, 2016). From 2012 to 2013, the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) and the Maritime Anti-Corruption Network (MACN) conducted a risk
assessment study in the Nigeria Port sector. The study found that corruption is widely
rationalized as part of the system and is an accepted tool to promote business interest.
It was also found that superior officials at the port put pressure on their subordinates
to comply with established corrupt practices (MACN, 2014). With such corrupt
practices amongst government officials who hold discretionary powers in Nigerian
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ports, it becomes easy for pirates to enhance their networks within the system to access
information on vessels navigating to and from the ports.
4.3.5 Commercialization of anti-piracy measures
In response to increased piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region, the innovative and
collaborative approaches adopted by states over the years have not been totally
sufficient and this is evidenced by the rising number of attacks in the region. This has
made private military security an attractive option for shipping companies whose
vessels ply the route. In some countries, shipping companies engage Private Military
Security Companies (PMSC) to either deploy armed guards on board their ships, or to
deploy an armed convoy escort vessel to guard the ship through piracy prone areas. In
such situations, the ship owners are required to comply with flag state and port state
regulations on transport and carriage of weapons (Dutton, 2013).
Nigeria is opposed to the use of armed guards on board vessels within its territorial
waters. PMSCs, Nigerian maritime security agencies and foreign ships navigating into
Nigerian waters are subject to this restriction (Osler, 2014). Although armed guards
are not allowed on board vessels in Nigerian waters, PMSCs have certain arrangements
with the Nigerian government. Several companies operate escort vessels in
cooperation with the Nigerian Navy. The vessels are owned and operated by the
PMSCs but part of the crew during operations is provided by the Nigerian Navy. In
addition, the naval detachment is solely responsible for weapon handling and
operational command (Ocean Beyond Piracy, 2017).
One of the contributing factors to Nigeria’s position is the challenge associated with
the use of armed guards on board vessels. There has been a case where Nigerian Navy
personnel accompanying a commercial vessel were killed by pirates and the crew taken
hostage (Anyimadu, 2013). There was also a case where Nigerian police deployed as
armed guards on board a commercial vessel (HISTRIA CORAL) fired at the Nigerian
Navy’s boarding party vessel which was approaching the HISTRIA CORAL for
inspection (Steffen, 2015).
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Another factor that has necessitated Nigeria maintaining its position on armed guards
is based on territorial sovereignty and concerns about unregistered weapons being
brought into the country (Anyimadu, 2013). The use of unregistered weapons by armed
guards on board vessels in the past have led to illegal activities such as gun trafficking.
Considering the fact that Niger Delta pirates are known to have sophisticated weapons,
which they obtain illegally, Nigeria is faced with the added task of arresting vessels
with armed guards. The case of MV Myre Seadiver is illustrative of Nigeria’s measures
against a PMSC that goes against its rules on armed guards. The MV Myre Seadiver
and its crew were arrested by the Nigerian Navy in 2012 for illegally entering Nigerian
waters carrying weapons. The ship owners claimed the vessel had a licence from the
Nigerian authorities to carry weapons, but the claim was rejected. The crew were
charged with illegal possession and importation of arms and ammunition (Anyimadu,
2013).
4.3.6 Limited inter-agency cooperation
The proliferation of agencies in the maritime sector of Nigeria has, rather than solve
the problems, created more. The law establishing some of these agencies often times
does not clearly delineate their respective duties and functions to the effect that same
or similar functions are given to each agency. This scenario has brought about a culture
of unspoken but real inter-agency rivalry, with some agencies, in a bid to exert
influence, claim credit or show relevance, engaging in all kinds of practices to
outsmart, discredit and even sabotage others (Odoma & Aerinto, 2013).
4.3.7 Maritime boundary dispute
The effective countering of piracy requires cooperation between states; however, one
major obstacle that impedes interstate cooperation is the concern over sovereignty
(Murphy, 2010). Cooperation is likely to be jeopardized if a state identifies another
state as a threat to its national interest and sovereignty. One such sovereignty concern
that makes cooperative initiatives difficult to implement is Maritime boundary dispute
(Ali, 2015) and when it exists between states, it bridges the relationship between the
government of the states and hinders interstate cooperation to fight piracy and armed
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robbery at sea. Examples of maritime disputes between states in the Gulf of Guinea
region include: Nigeria and Cameroon dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula; Ghana and
Ivory Coast dispute over oil rich waters, Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon dispute over
an island at the mouth of the Ntem river and Gabon and Equatorial Guinea over Mbone
Island and Corisco Bay (Mandanda & Ping, 2016).
Until recently, when the Cameroonian navy made an effort to foster collaborations
with the Nigerian navy, the maritime dispute between the two countries over the
Bakassi Peninsula had hindered effective governance and security presence in the
Bakassi Peninsula (Affe, 2017). In 2002, when the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
gave its judgment in favour of Cameroon, a majority of the indigenes were disgruntled
about the decision because they believed that they ought to have been consulted by the
ICJ before it declared the Bakassi Peninsula as Cameroon’s Territory. For this reason,
they decided to break away from Nigeria and Cameroon in order to form their own
nation. Some of the indigenes who later became the Bakassi Freedom Fighters tried to
make their voices heard through involvement in terrorist acts, hostage taking and
piracy at sea. The pirates who were known as the African Marine Commando, in
collaboration with the MEND, were involved in constant attacks of vessels and kidnap
of crew (Funteh, 2015).
4.3.8 Poor inter-state cooperation
The differences in culture of states within the Gulf of Guinea region hinder cooperation
between states. This view is premised on the fact that the countries in the region speak
different languages, and have different approaches to governance. Moreover, their
navies have different equipment and different standard operating procedures. For these
reasons, some of the navies withhold certain information that could be helpful in the
fight against piracy, hindering information sharing which is key for effective
cooperation amongst states within the region (Mandanda & Ping, 2016).
The analysis in this chapter demonstrated that piracy in Nigeria is increasing due to
inadequate law enforcement. The chapter revealed that the identified challenges are
responsible for the poor law enforcement measures. From the analysis in this chapter,
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it is obvious that the challenges create gaps in law enforcement which make it easy for
piracy and armed robbery at sea to flourish in Nigeria. Having identified the challenges
hindering effective law enforcement, it becomes necessary to determine the way
forward to enhance enforcement measures both at the national and regional level. In
the next chapter, the findings in this research are discussed and summarized in order
to connect the dots of the research and suggest the way forward.
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5

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The research aimed to identify the challenges of combating piracy in Nigeria. It
identified the challenges by examining the nature and trends of piracy and armed
robbery at sea with particular focus on Somalia, the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria. It
examined the causes of piracy in Nigeria and found that most of the causes have roots
onshore due to widespread poverty, unemployment, corruption, politics, culture, weak
law enforcement capacity and constant conflict between government and ethnic
groups. The research further analysed the substance of the legal context for piracy in
international law and identified the legal and institutional frameworks at the national
and regional levels. It provided data on enforcement measures at the national level and
identified gaps. The challenges identified are classified into legal and operational.
5.1

Legal Challenges

The research revealed that international law on piracy and armed robbery at sea
requires states to criminalize and punish piracy in national legislation, but Nigeria has
failed to implement the UNCLOS and SUA frameworks. Nigeria incorporated the
1988 SUA frameworks in its Merchant Shipping Act but the Act does not conform to
the requirements of the SUA Convention. It was also revealed that Nigeria is yet to
ratify the 2005 SUA Protocols which are very important for attacks against platforms,
a common type of piracy attack in Nigeria.
It was further revealed that, of all the regional legal frameworks on piracy in the Gulf
of Guinea, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct is the only framework that provides a
comprehensive strategy to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region. Though the
code has been adopted and signed, it has yet to be implemented.
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5.2

Operational Challenges

The research revealed that platforms for enforcement measures are inadequate. This
being the case, it becomes difficult for law enforcement agencies to ensure quick
response to distress calls; hence, pirates succeed in their attacks before help is rendered
to the vessel in distress.
The lack of skilled personnel was also addressed and this revealed that law
enforcement officers lack technical know-how which affects their ability to preserve
evidence. This usually weighs in favour of arrested pirates who use it as grounds to
gain freedom.
It was found that the existence of corruption in Nigeria hinders enforcement measures
and it helps pirates develop their networks. The corruption in the system makes most
of the pirates confident that, even though they are arrested, it may not take long before
they are released because they have connections in high places.
Another issue addressed was prosecution of pirates. The number of persons prosecuted
after arrest is few because agencies responsible for arrest lack the power to prosecute.
It was found that the Nigerian Navy and NIMASA do not have the power to prosecute
pirates. After investigations, the pirates are handed over to the prosecuting agency and
in some regions there are delays in prosecution because of unavailability of prosecutors
which often leads to release of pirates either by court order on human rights claims or
on constitutional grounds. It was revealed that the establishment of new maritime
agencies in Nigeria with similar roles hinders inter agency cooperation in the fight
against piracy.
Further examination of regional institutions revealed that there are four platforms
serving the Gulf of Guinea region and the platforms have different cooperation
agendas. The research revealed that that MOWCA failed to achieve its coast guard
MOU because states are unwilling to commit to the agreement on grounds of
sovereignty issues. ECOWAS failed to establish a maritime security cooperation
strategy and its only output is the bilateral agreement between Nigeria and Benin. The
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research revealed that while the GGC commands great recognition and could be the
organization to develop a robust maritime security cooperation and enforcement
framework, it has so far been unable to achieve its objectives. On the other hand,
ECCAS has been able to provide a functional maritime security framework but Nigeria
is not a member of the organization. In summary, the research showed that the
conflicting approaches of the institutions undermine the main objective of regional
cooperation and this impacts on cooperation between states in the region.
5.3

Nigeria Effort to Combat Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea

At the national level, one of the first measures adopted to repress piracy and armed
robbery at sea was the initiative to curb militancy. Militancy was a major source of
piracy in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. For this reason, Nigeria introduced an
amnesty programme which provided opportunity for the militants to surrender. The
initiative was successful and many militants responsible for piracy attacks within the
region surrendered their arms (Matthew, 2012).
Following the amnesty programme, the Nigerian government in 2012 transformed its
military Joint Task Force (Operation Restore Hope) into an expanded maritime
security force (Operation Pulo Shield). The Joint Task Force, which was initially
established to combat militancy in the Niger Delta, was then mandated to eliminate
piracy, all forms of sea robbery and other maritime offences (Onuoha, 2013).
Nigeria has also been involved in the acquisition of patrol vessels and the improvement
of its surveillance systems. In 2016, the Nigerian Navy launched a new surveillance
system known as “FALCON EYE” which was aimed towards providing enhanced
maritime domain awareness and surveillance capabilities to combat piracy and other
maritime offences (Wertheim, 2017).
In addition to the FALCON EYE system, the Nigerian Navy has also adopted a new
choke point strategy to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea. The strategy involves
stationing house boats in various creeks and estuaries for easy patrolling (Ezeobi,
2016).
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Similarly, NIMASA entered into a memorandum of understanding with the Nigerian
Air Force for the use of locally produced Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for air
surveillance of Nigerian coastal waters (Kajo, 2016).
NIMASA has also made effort to ensure that the relevant international conventions on
piracy and armed robbery at sea are implemented. Recently, NIMASA forwarded a
new anti-piracy Bill to the Nigerian Ministry of Justice for presentation as an executive
Bill to the National Assembly (Nwanchukwu, 2017). If the Bill is passed into law, it
will help remedy the legislative gap that hinders law enforcement against piracy and
armed robbery at sea.
Recently, Nigeria established a Harmonized Standard Operating Procedure (HSOP)
on arrest, detention and prosecution of vessels and persons in its maritime environment
(See Appendix 6). The HSOP is designed to guide the operations of maritime law
enforcement agencies, solve the problem of overlapping functions and inter agency
rivalry, and to promote inter agency cooperation (Azu, 2017).
The fight against piracy is difficult when conducted solely by an individual state. This
is premised on the fact that persons involved in acts of piracy may commit the act in
the territorial waters of one state and then navigate to another state’s territorial waters
to escape arrest. Therefore, even though effort is made to combat piracy at the national
level, it might not be easy to effectively combat the offence when the neighbouring
state’s effort to combat the offence is weak, hence the need for joint forces and
strategies between Nigeria and neighbouring states (Madanda & Ping, 2016). In this
regard, Nigeria has shown efforts in repressing piracy and armed robbery at the
regional level. Its participation in the bilateral agreement for joint patrol across
maritime borders with Benin and its participation in the various regional institutions
highlighted in chapter three of this research is evidence of its effort to repress the
offences not just within its territorial waters but also in the waters off its coast.
Nigeria has also made efforts to improve its law enforcement capacity to ensure the
safety and security of shipping by collaborating with the United States and
participating in the regional exercise (Exercise Obangame) conducted by the United
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States African Command, which is aimed towards improving cooperation between
participating nations and improving their law enforcement capacity (United States
African Command, nd).
5.4

The Way Forward

Although Nigeria has made efforts to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea, there is
need to do more. The way forward to remedy the challenges of combating piracy in
Nigeria would be to:
a. Improve the legal and operational measures currently in place to combat piracy
b. To improve cooperation between the regional institutions.
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6

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The first conclusion drawn from this research is that Nigeria’s delay in the
implementation of the UNCLOS, SUA Convention and SUA Protocol has the most
significant effect on law enforcement. This conclusion is validated by the findings in
chapters three, four and five. The analysis in chapter three has shown the extent to
which the international legal framework can help solve the problems of piracy and
armed robbery at sea. The chapter identified the gaps in the international legal
frameworks but concluded that, although the UNCLOS may be inapplicable to certain
piracy attacks the SUA Convention and Protocols are available to remedy most of the
gaps. Therefore, the Conventions when implemented, can to a large extent, solve the
piracy problem in Nigeria. The chapter further assessed the extent to which Nigeria
has ratified and implemented the conventions. The conclusion reached was that
Nigeria has ratified UNCLOS, the SUA Convention and the SUA protocol of 1988 but
has failed to implement the conventions. It also found that Nigeria has yet to ratify the
2005 SUA Protocols which, if ratified, would be very relevant in combating piracy
and armed robbery at sea in Nigeria because of the nature of attacks that exist within
its territorial waters and in the Gulf of Guinea. Analysis in chapter four further
revealed that Nigeria practices a dualistic legal system; hence, mere ratification is not
automatic

implementation

of

the

convention.

Thus,

ratification

without

implementation creates a situation of catch and release. Chapter five also revealed the
efforts Nigeria has made so far to combat piracy and recent efforts show that there
have been some improvements in enforcement capacity Chapter five shows that
Nigeria had acquired some platforms, improved its surveillance system, established a
harmonized standard operating procedure for maritime law enforcement agencies and
is currently participating in capacity building of law enforcement personnel. While
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these efforts had been made, the process for the enactment of anti-piracy law just
commenced. It follows, therefore, that the efficacy of surveillance, patrols and arrest
had been seriously undermined due the absence of domestic legislation to prosecute
and punish persons arrested. The findings in this research support the conclusion that
delay in the enactment of anti-piracy laws in Nigeria has the most significant effect on
maritime law enforcement against piracy and armed robbery at sea.
The second conclusion drawn from this research is that Regional Institutional
frameworks lack coordination and have failed to ensure cooperation between the Gulf
of Guinea states. This conclusion is validated by the analysis in chapter three which
showed that there are four regional institutions concurrently serving the Gulf of Guinea
region to ensure maritime security cooperation. The analysis revealed that the
institutions are at different stages of development with the ECCAS framework being
the most established. The institutions, particularly the GGC and ECCAS have different
cooperation agendas regardless of the fact that all members of the GGC except Nigeria
are also members of ECCAS. This creates a conflicting approach to cooperation
between states and undermines the process of maritime security cooperation. The
analysis in chapter three suggests that the regional institution is an avenue for
establishing closer relations between the Gulf of Guinea states and for enhancing
maritime security within the region. This is, however, not being manifested as chapter
four revealed the limited information sharing between states due to certain cultural
differences, sovereignty issues, military confidentiality rules, and differences in
operation procedures of the navies. These points support the conclusion that the
regional institutions lack coordination and have failed to ensure cooperation between
states in the Gulf of Guinea.
The last conclusion drawn from this research is that piracy can be reduced if land based
problems are addressed. This conclusion is supported by chapter two. Chapter two
described the nature of piracy in Nigeria and highlighted the causes. The causes
highlighted point toward the fact that the crime is accepted as a normal way of life and
is being perceived as a career option because of the economic situation of the country.
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Chapter four also highlighted some challenges that hinders law enforcement against
piracy and armed robbery at sea and most of the identified challenges are land based.
Although Nigeria has made efforts to ensure effective law enforcement against piracy
and armed robbery at sea, the efforts are not effective enough. Nigeria need to improve
its law enforcement capacity, improve governance and put more efforts into solving
land based problems such as corruption, unemployment and poverty. Improving the
economic situation in Nigeria may be difficult to achieve in a short time due to certain
political, financial and economic constraints, in the long run, it would help reduce acts
of piracy in Nigeria and in the Gulf of Guinea.
At the regional level, cooperation between states could be achieved if the Gulf of
Guinea states can agree on which platform would be solely responsible for the
development and implementation of cooperation strategies that would ensure national
and international participation. The platform would therefore be responsible for the
implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct to improve cooperation between the
Gulf of Guinea states and develop a regional strategy that would combat the growing
threat.
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APPENDIX 1
MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT
ARRANGMENT OF SECTIONS
Certificates

PART I: Administration of the
Act
1.
Administration
delegation of powers.
2.

of

Act

Agency for Maritime
Administration.

227.

Issue of certificates of survey

228. Issue of safety certificates to
and passengers ships, e.t.c
229.
Safety

Issue to cargo ships of safety
equipment and exemption
certificates

230. Issue to cargo ships of radio
3.
Returns as to merchant shipping, certificates and exem certificates
etc., to the Minister.
231. Issue of general safety
4.

certificates, etc., on
compliance with rules

Appointment of officers.

232. Transmission of certificates.
Modification of provisions for exemption of

PART II: Restriction on
Trading in Nigeria 5. Certificate
of licence required by all ships
trading in Nigeria.

ships
233.

Notice of alterations and additional
surveys

234.

Certificate to be posted on board

235.

Prohibition
on
proceeding to sea
without appropriate
certificates.

236.

Modification of Safety Convention
certificates in

National Character of Ships
6.

partial

Need to show colours.

7.
National character of ships to be
declared before clearance.

56

211. Documents to be handed over
to successor on change of
master.

Miscellaneous
212. Minister may dispense with
transaction
before
superintendent.
213. Deposit of documents at overseas
port.
214. Conflict of laws.
215. Application to unregistered ships.
PART XII: Safety of Life at Sea
General Provisions
216.

217.

Application
of
some
related maritime safety
Conventions and Protocols.
Regulations.

218. Breach of safety regulations.
Survey of Ships

433. Board of Survey.
Scientific Referees 434. Reference in
difficult cases to scientific persons.
PART XXX: Subsidiary Legislation

435.

General power to make regulations.

436.

General power of exemption.

437.

Applicable Conventions, etc.

438.

Penalty in subsidiary legislation.

439.

Applied legislation.

PART XXXI:
Transition

Repeals

and

Repeals, etc.
440.
441.

Repeal of Cap. 224 L.F.N. 1990.
Consequential amendments.

442. Contravention
Conventions.

219.

Surveyors of ships.

220.

Ships to be surveyed annually.

221.

Surveyor's record of inspections
443.
and certificates.

Transitional Provisions

57

The Schedules.

of

International

PART XII
APPLICATION OF SOME RELATED MARITIME SAFETYCONVENTIONS
AND PROTOCOLS
216 As from the commencement of this Act, the following Conventions,
Protocols and their amendments relating to maritime safety shall apply, that is(a)

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS);

(b)

Protocol relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea, 1988 and Annexes I to V thereto;

(c)

International Convention on Standards of Training Certification and
Watch Keeping of Seafarers, 1978 (STCW) as amended;

(d)
(e)

(f)

International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979 (SAR);
International Labour Organisation Convention (No. 32 of 1932) on
Protection against Accident of Workers Employed in Loading or
Unloading Ships (Dockers Convention Revised 1932);
International Convention on Maritime Satellite Organisation, 1976 (INMARSA T) and the Protocol thereto;

(g)

the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and
their Luggage by Sea, 1974 and its Protocol of 1990;

(h)

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, 1988 and the Protocol thereto;

(i)

International Convention on Salvage, 1989;

(j)

Placing of Seamen Convention, 1920;

(k)

International Ship and Ports Facility Security (ISPS) Code; and

(l)

International Convention for Safe Containers, 1972.

217
REGULATIONS
(1)
The minister may make such regulations as he deems necessary or expedient
for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this part of this Act.
(2).

Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section and
the provisions contained in this section, the Ministry may by regulation
provide for-

(a)

the survey of ships and the issue of certificates.
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(b)

the types and forms of certificate

(c)

the construction and equipments of ships including the provision of lifesaving and fire- fighters appliances.

(d)

radio communications in ships.

(e)

the safety of navigation.

(f)

the carriage of grain by ships;

(g)

the carriage of dangerous goods by ships.

(h)

the safety of navigation.

(i)

the design, construction, surveys and marking of nuclear ships;

(j)

the management and safe operations of ships.

(k)

the construction, surveys and marking of high speed crafts; and

(l)

special measures to measures to enhance the memorandum on port state
control.

(3) The regulations made under this section shall, in the case of ships to which the
safety Convention applies, include such requirements as appear to the Minister
necessary for the implementation of the provisions of the Safety Convention or any
International Convention on safety.

59

APPENDIX 2
DISTRESS (PIRACY) FROM 2013 TO 2017 FROM NIMASA DATABASE
S/N

NATURE OF
DISTRESS

DATE/TIME

1

PIRACY ATTACK

09/01/2013

2

PIRACY ATTACK

3

PIRACY ATTACK

4

PIRACY ATTACK

5

PIRACY ATTACK

6

PIRACY ATTACK

12/01/2013
1832HRS LT
14/01/2013
0941hrs LT
18/01/2013
1759HRS
31/01/2013
0903HRS LT
02/02/2013
1559HRS LT

7

PIRACY ATTACK

8

REPORTED BY

Letters from Atlantic
Shrimpers
CRS

NAME/MMSI

SMS from GEN
AROMIRE
Email from IMB

MFV UNIVERSAL V
MT ITRI

04 1.0N
007 34.5E
03 51.8N
006 45.81E
04 15N
007 47E
Abidjan

SMS from GEN
AROMIRE
EMAIL FROM IMB

MFV LOTUS 1

Near fish town

MT OLIVIA II

03/02/2013
1553HRS LT

SMS FROM GEN
AROMIRE

PIRACY ATTACK

03/02/2013

9

PIRACY ATTACK

10

PIRACY ATTACK

04/02/2013
1249HRS LT
05/02/2013
1400 HRS LT

CALL FROM
+971509122042
EMAIL FROM IMB

MFV MERMAID II
(MFV SILVER
MERMAID II)
MT PYXIS DELTA

03 46.3N
005 49.1E
40Nm SW of the
mouth or River Niger
AFTER FORCADOS

LETTER FROM
KARFLEX FISHRIES
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MFV LOTUS III

POSITION

MV ARMADA 107

MT GASCOGNE
REENA

06 19.14N
003 24.2E
05 24.56N
001 44.95E
Ajumo, Igbonla
(Between Lagos &

11

PIRACY ATTACK

05/02/2013
1400 HRS LT

12

PIRACY ATTACK

06/02/2013
1127HRS LT

13

PIRACY ATTACK

14

PIRACY ATTACK

07/02/2013
0021HRS LT
08/02/2013
1320HRS LT

15

PIRACY ATTACK

16

PIRACY ATTACK

17

PIRACY ATTACK

18

PIRACY ATTACK

19
20

Attempted PIRACY
ATTACK
PIRACY ATTACK

21

PIRACY ATTACK

22

PIRACY ATTACK

10/02/2013
1714HRS LT
10/02/2013
1714HRS LT
11/02/2013
1500HRS
11/02/2013
1500HRS
11/02/2013
0123HRS
12/02/2013
1109HRS
13/02/2013
0438HRS
13/02/2013

LTD
LETTER FROM
KARFLEX FISHRIES
LTD
LOCAL MEDIA/IMB

SABREENA

Ogun)
East of Bush near
Lekki, Lagos

OIL BARGE
BELONGING TO
STERLING GLOBAL
OIL RESOURCES

NEAR
FORCADOSWARRI,
DELTA STATE

MV ESTHER C

02 47N
005 48E
FISH TOWN

EMAIL FROM IMB
PRC
LETTER FROM
ATLANTIC
SHRIMPERS LTD
EMAIL FROM IMB

MFV MALAMA
ASIYA

EMAIL FROM IMB

FT LAMU 2

SMS FROM AD SAR

FT ORC V

04 17.7N
007 53.3E
04 17.7N
007 53.3E
Bartholomew

SMS FROM AD SAR

FT ROBIN

Bartholomew

EMAIL FROM IMB

MV SAFMARINE
SAHEL
WALVIS 7

04 06.68N
006 52.57E
03 33.55N
006 35.39E
03 40.48N
005 53.12E
04 0N 008 20E

FT LAMU 1

EMAIL FROM ED MS
& SD
EMAIL FROM IMB

ARMADA TUGAS 1

EMAIL FROM IMB

SEA BULK NIGER

61

2226HRS LT
23

17/02/2013
0045HRS LT
17/02/2013083
9HRS LT
17/02/2013150
1HRS LT
18/02/2013
1600HRS LT

EMAIL FROM IMB

DAMACO FRANCIA

EMAIL FROM IMB

MV AFRICAN JOY

EMAIL FROM IMB

TUG ARMADA
TUAH 101
MFV LILY AND
STAR SHRIMPER II

22/02/2013
2011HRS
01/03/2013
1135HRS LT
04/03/2013
1240HRS LT

CALL FROM THE
VESSEL’S CAPTAIN
Call from ORC 7
OWNER (Emire)
SMS FROM
ATLANTIC
SHRIMPERS LTD
SMS FROM
ATLANTIC
SHRIMPERS LTD

24

Attempted PIRACY
ATTACK
PIRACY ATTACK

25

PIRACY ATTACK

26

PIRACY ATTACK

27

PIRACY ATTACK

28

PIRACY ATTACK

29

PIRACY ATTACK

30

PIRACY ATTACK

04/03/2013
1402HRS LT

31

PIRACY ATTACK

04/03/2013
1240HRS LT

32

PIRACY ATTACK
(Sea Robbers)

05/03/2013
1304 HRS LT

ATLANTIC
SHRIMPERS LTD

MV KOTA
BAHAGIA
ORC 7

91.82Nm SE of PORT
HARCOURT
03-33.2N
006-20.45E.
06 26.76N 003 22.70E
APAPA PORT
03. 57N 005 21.0E
OFF NICHOLAS
BARBARA FISHING
AREA AT 10
FATHOMS
03 51N
005 57E
Around Escravos

MFV LEVI

Between Fish Town &
Middle Town

MFV STAR
SHRIMPER 3

04 05N
006 14.5E

IMB VIA SMS

ARAMADA 22

LETTER FROM
KARFLEX FISHRIES

REENA

03 44N
006 19.3E moved to
03 49N
006 50.8E
Along Badagry Waters
Lagos

62

LTD
LETTER FROM
KARFLEX FISHRIES
LTD
LETTER FROM
KARFLEX FISHRIES
LTD
Email from IMB

33

PIRACY ATTACK
(Sea Robbers)

05/03/2013
1400 HRS LT

34

PIRACY ATTACK
(Sea Robbers)

05/03/2013
1411 HRS LT

35

Sea Robbery

36

PIRACY ATTACK
(Sea Robbers)

09/03/2013
2215Hrs LT
11/03/2013
1242 HRS LT

37

PIRACY ATTACK
(Sea Robbers)

11/03/2013
1954 HRS LT

LETTER FROM
KARFLEX FISHRIES
LTD
SMS FROM GEN.
AROMIRE

38

PIRACY ATTACK
(Sea Robbers)

21/03/2013
2108 HRS LT

39

PIRACY ATTACK
(Sea Robbers)

40

41

MAREENA

Near Maroko Waters
Lagos

SABREENA II

Middleton, Dodo River
and Brass

LPG Tanker

06: 27N
003: 23E
Benin River

MAREENA III

STAR SHRIMPER 26

OFF BONNY
TERMINAL 17NM
OFF SHORE

SMS FROM GEN.
AROMIRE

MFV LILY III

OFF FORMOSO
ABOUT 12Nm

21/03/2013
2108 HRS LT

SMS FROM GEN.
AROMIRE

MFV LILY III

OFF FORMOSO
ABOUT 12Nm

PIRACY ATTACK
(Sea Robbers)

21/03/2013
2108 HRS LT

SMS FROM GEN.
AROMIRE

MFV STAR
SHRIMPER II
& UNIVERSAL IV

OFF
SENGANA ABOUT
12Nm

PIRACY ATTACK
(Sea Robbers)

26/03/2013
1338 HRS LT

SMS FROM GEN.
AROMIRE

MFV Cosmos 1
&2

OFF SAMBRAREO
ABOUT 12Nm

63

42

31/03/2013
0207hrs LT
03/04/2013
1500HRS LT

EMAIL FROM IMB

MT SEA HERMES

43

ATTEMPTED PIR
ACY ATTACK
PIRACY ATTACK

Ministry Of Foreign
Affairs

ANDREA

44

PIRACY ATTACK

KARFLEX FISHERIES

SABRENA II

45

PIRACY ATTACK

46

PIRACY ATTACK

09/04/2013
1343HRS LT
10/04/2013
1104HRS LT
14/04/2013
1225HRS LT

BOURBON LIBERTY
251
Gen Araromi

47

PIRACY ATTACK

16/04/2006
0154HRS LT

IMB

48

PIRACY ATTACK

49

PIRACY ATTACK

50

PIRACY ATACK

Letter from Atlantic
Shrimpers Ltd
SMS FROM VSL
OWNERS
PHONE CALL

51

ATTEMPTED
PIRACY ATACK
PIRACY ATTACK

19/04/2013
1341HRS LT
24/04/2013
0933HRS LT
26/04/2013
1635HRS LT
26/04/2013
1635HRS LT
05/05/2013
1400HRS LT
05/05/2013
1025HRS LT

IMO 636015324
MV LEON DIAS
STAR SHRIMPER 2,
STAR SHRIMPER 8,
COSMOS 2 & 5
MV CAP
THEODORA
IMO: 9380740
CALL sign: SVAMS
MFV LILY II

52
53

ATTEMPTED
PIRACY ATTACK

PHONE CALL FROM
OWNERS
IMB
IMB

64

MFV DAHLIA
CITY OF XIAMEN
CITY OF
GUANGZHOU
CMA CGM AFRICA
FOUR
MV FRIO ATHENS

03 57.3N
006 41.0E
Sao Tome
and Principle and
Gabon
ANDONI
03 49N
06 24E
Off Koulama River,
close to Fish Town.
01 48N
006 46E

OFF Awoye deepwater
WITHIN BONNY
AND QUO IBOE
04 10.44N
005 30.29E
04 10.44N
005 30.29E
South of Port Harcourt
33Nm SW of Bonny
River

54

ATTEMPTED
PIRACY ATTACK

05/05/2013
0425HRS LT

55

ATTEMPTED
PIRACY ATTACK
PIRACY ATTACK

05/05/2013
0516HRS LT
06/05/2013
0940HRS LT
07/05/2013
1737HRS LT
09/05/2013
0131HRS LT
10/05/2013
1457HRS LT
16/05/2013
1200HRS LT

56
57

59

ATTEMPTED
PIRACY ATTACK
ATTEMPTED
PIRACY ATTACK
PIRACY ATTACK

60

PIRACY ATTACK

61

UNCONFIRMED
ABDUCTION

18/05/2013
0946HRS LT

62

PIRACY ATTACK

20/05/2013
1020HRS LT

63

PIRACY ATTACK

20/05/2013
1502HRS LT

64

PIRACY ATTACK

25/05/2013
0830HRS LT

58

US COAST GUARD,
MRCC MALTA &
ITALIAN MRCC
Call from Captain of MT
Tom Lene
EMAIL FROM IMB
EMAIL FROM IMB
VHF 16
SMS FROM GEN.
AROMIRE
SMS FROM
ATLANTIC
SHRIMPERS LTD
SMS FROM
UNIDENTIFIED SOS
SMS FROM GEN
AROMIRE
ATLANTIC
SHRIMPERS LTD
SMS FROM GEN
AROMIRE ATLANTIC
SHRIMPERS LTD
CALL FROM JIBRIN
KYARI FROM
MATRIX SHIPPING

65

SEA PRIDE

05 49N
001 22E

MT TOM LENE

MV CENTENARIO
BLU
MT BLUE GREEN
TIGER
MFV AWELE

Capital Oil Jetty,
Lagos Port
30Nm of South of
Bonny Coastline
04 43.25N
008 20.73E
06 19.8N
003 26.7E
OFF BRASS

MFV STAR
SHRIMPERS V

OFF PENNINGTON
FISHING AREA

ORC 7 &
TRADEWIND

BARTHOLOMEW
AND BONNY
ANCHORAGE
04 31.925N
005 25.679E

UTAI 8

STAR SHRIMPER
XXIII, Silver Mermaid
III and Rose III
STAR SHRIMPER VII

OFF Nicholas

MT MATRIX 1

03 34.17N
005 27.07E

65
66

ATTEMPTED
PIRACY ATTACK
PIRACY ATTACK

67

PIRACY ATTACK

68

PIRACY ATTACK

69

PIRACY ATTACK

70

PIRACY ATTACK

71

PIRACY ATTACK

72
73

74
75

29/05/2013
0830HRS LT
01/06/2013
1548HRS LT
05/06/2013
1126HRS LT
10/06/2013
1530HRS LT
12/06/2013
1100HRS LT

VHF 16

Sea Adventurer

IMB

BLUEGREEN TIGER

IMB

BOURBON
ARETHUSE
MFV BISOLA

GEN. AROMIRE
Gen Aromire
ATLANTIC
SHRIMPERS LTD

MFV COSMOS I,
STAR SHRIMPER I &
STAR SHRIMPER
XIX
MFV HAJIYA
BINTA
MDPL
CONTINENTAL

12/06/2013
1500HRS LT
14/06/2013
1120HRS LT

ATLANTIC
SHRIPMERS
ED (MS&SD)

SUSPECTED
PIRACY ATTACK
SUSPECTED
PIRACY ATTACK

14/06/2013
0633HRS LT
18/06/2013
0820HRS LT

IMB

MV BALAO

IMB

SAINT PATRICK

SUSPECTED
PIRACY ATTACK
PIRACY ATTACK

18/06/2013
1651HRS LT
01/07/2013
1451HRS LT

Karflex fisheries
SMS
SMS FROM
KINGSLEY
ENAHORO

MAREENA II & III

66

STAR SHRIMPER 25,
16 AND 18

06 20.66N
003 27.35E
A RIVER WITHIN
CALABAR
USARI FIELD,
USAN PLATFORM
Escravos Area
OFF BRASS @ 10
FATHOMS

ESCRAVOS
FORCADOS
04 02.5N
008 00.3E
54Nm SE OF Bonny
JV Camp
04 59N
002 40.3E
04 25N
007 28E
7Nm SSW of Opobo
River Estuary
Under way to Lagos
AROUND BRASS
AREA “ABOUT
0600HRS ON

76

PIRACY ATTACK

77

PIRACY ATTACK

78
79

PIRACY ATTACK
(Suspicious)
PIRACY ATTACK

12/07/2013
1701HRS LT
16/07/2013
0834HRS LT

80

PIRACY ATTACK

18/07/2013
1246HRS LT

SMS FROM OWNERS

MFV MADAM
EMOTAN

81

PIRACY ATTACK

22/07/2013
1520HRS LT

REPORT FROM
CONOIL

CONOIL TUG BOAT
AND BARGE

82

PIRACY ATTACK

EMAIL FROM IMB

MT LOULOU

83

EMAIL FROM IMB

MV PORT KENNY

EMAIL FROM IMB

HIGH JUPITER

85

ATTEMPTED
PIRATE ATTACK
ATTEMPTED
PIRATE ATTACK
PIRATE ATTACK

08034505594

86

PIRACY ATTACK

BUMI ARAMADA
PERDANA
MEREENA 1

87

PIRACY ATTACK

25/07/2013
1036HRS LT
28/07/2013
0634HRS LT
31/07/2013
0800HRS LT
01/08/2013
1027HRS LT
12/08/2013
1050HRS LT
12/08/2013
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04/07/2013
1508HRS LT
10/07/2013
0835HRS LT

ATLANTIC
SHRIMPERS LTD
LETTER FROM
ATLANTIC
SHRIMPERS LTD
EMAIL FROM IMB
EMAIL FROM IMB

LETTER FROM
KARFLEX
SMS FROM GENERAL

67

MFV STAR
SHRIMPER XXVIII
MFV SHRIMPER
XXX
MT OVERSEAS
ATHENS
MT COTTON

MFV STAR

27/06/2013
OFF CALABAR
COAST
OFF DODO
PENNINGTON
06 26.3N
003 17.7E
NEAR GABON
01 39.07N
003 50.02E
OPOBO/QUA IBOE
AREA
004 11 21.3N
007 53 00.4E
ENROUTE TO
KOLUAMA FROM
OLUGBOBIRI
04 16N
007 56E
COTONOU
ANCHORAGE
03 31N
006 05E
05 23.16.66N
UNKNOWN
UNKNOWN

88

1404HRS LT
12/08/2013
1142HRS LT
14/08/2013
0900HRS LT

89

ATTEMPTED
PIRATE ATTACK
PIRACY ATTACK

90

PIRACY ATTACK

91

PIRACY ATTACK

92

PIRACY ATTACK

93
94

ATTEMPTED
PIRATE ATTACK
PIRATE ATTACK

95

PIRACY ATTACK

96

PIRACY ATTACK

97

ATTEMPTED
PIRATE ATTACK
SUSPECTED
PIRATE ATTACK

14/08/2013
2057HRS LT
14/08/2013
0340HRS LT
15/08/2013
1046HRS LT
15/08/2013
1850HRS
19/08/2013
1100HRS LT
22/08/2013
0900HRS LT
26/08/2013
1321HRS LT

99

ATTEMPTED
PIRATE ATTACK

27/08/2013
0700HRS

100

PIRACY ATTACK

10/09/13 0949

98

14/08/2013
1310HRS LT
14/08/2013

AROMIRE
EMAIL FROM IMB

SHRIMPER I
MT FPMC 25

LETTER FROM
ATLANTIC
SHRIMPERS LTD
AD COMM/NNPC

MFV SILVER
MERMAID II
& LEVI
MT NOTRE

REP.’S PHONE
CALL/IMB
OWNERS PHONE
CALL
OWNERS PHONE
CALL
INFO FROM OIC MGC

SP ATLANTA
PRAMARA
SHIPPING BARGE
BLUE GREEN TIGRE

EMAIL FROM IMB

MV LETAVIA

SMS FROM OWNER

MFV ADUNOLA
AND OTHERS
MT BLUE SKY

LETTER FROM VSL
MANAGERS
SMS FROM AD SAR
(FROM THE VSL
AGENT)
FROM MEDIA
(NATIONAL TV
NEWS)
Babatunde James
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MT CROW

MT VARY STARR

LAGOS ANCHORGE
FORCADOS AT
16Nm & 15Fathoms
respectively
LAGOS
ANCHORAGE
LAGOS AREA
06 09.25N
004 34.31E
LAGOS
ANCHORAGE
06 14.24N
004 20.52E
05 05N
003 42E
BRASS/FISHING
TOWN/NICHOLAS
04 00.21N
009 12.87E
07 54.16N
001 30.77S

BRENDA CORLETT

ORON PILATE
ISLAND, CALABAR

MT SAMPATIKI

DANTATA Jetty,

101

PIRACY ATTACK

102

PIRACY ATTACK

103

PIRACY ATTACK

104

PIRACY ATTACK
(Loss of
Communication)

105

PIRACY ATTACK

106

PIRACY ATTACK

107

PIRACY ATTACK

108

PIRACY ATTACK

109

PIRATE ATTACK

110

PIRACY ATTACK

111

PIRACY ATTACK

112

PIRACY ATTACK

hrs
26/08/13
1000Hrs
11/08/13
11/09/13 0019
hrs
03/10/2013
0822HRS LT

08/10/2013
1624HRS LT
15/10/2013
1402HRS LT
24/10/2013
0600HRS LT
24/10/2013
2208HRS LT
03/11/2013
1728HRS
12/11/2013
1500HRS LT
12/11/2013
1500HRS LT
16/12/2013
0102HRS LT

CRS

SPEED BOAT

CRS

PASSENGER BOATS

Atlantic shrimper

MFV Cosmos 1,SS1X
SSVI And XV
MT MALPENSA

OWNERS
PHONE CALL &
EMAIL
EMAIL FROM VSL
AGENT
SMS FROM OWNER
(ATLANTIC
SHRIMPERS)
EMAIL FROM IMB

MT BELISARE
MFV ADUNOLA

C-RETRIEVER

VHF CALL FROM
PORT CONTROL

HISTIA CORAL

IMB EMAIL

MV Waterloo

EMAIL FROM NEMA

MV Surfer 322

EMAIL FROM USCG

JASCON 12

MRCC FRANCE

MV ATLANTA

69

TINCAN
04 33N 007 08E
04 26N
006 46E
Qua Iboe shore range
04 12.31”N
006 56.62”E

MRS DANTATA
JETTY
NEAR BRASS

OFF BRASS,
BAYELSA STATE
LAGOS WATERS
06 17.301N
003 22.151E

04 01.8N
009 39.6E
5.30N
4.59E
03 55.9N
007 49.8E

113

PIRACY ATTACK

13/01/2014

IMB

MT ALTHEA

114

PIRACY ATTACK

EMAIL FROM IMB

MT KERALA

115

PIRACY
DISTRESS

21/01/2014
1215HRS
05/02/2014
0815HRS

SUEZ VASILIS
538004317

116

ATTEMPT.
PIRACY

18/02/2014
0502HRS

MRCC
ROME/IMB/MRCC
AUSTRALIA/MADRID
IMB
MAIL

08 41S
013 15E
03 45.0N
006 24.E

MT MASTERS
FORCE II

03 57N
005 13E

117

PIRACY
ATTACK/
KIDNAP
PIRACY
ATTACK
PIRACY
ATTACK/
KIDNAP
PIRACY
ATTACK/
KIDNAP
ATTEMPTED
PIRACY
ATTACK
PIRACY
ATTACK
ROBBERY

04/03/2014
0404HRS

IMB

MV PRESCIOS1

OMC
STATION

05/03/2014
0623HRS
06/03/2014
2219HRS

IMB

MV SSI
PRIDE
PRIME
LADY

04 00.2N
005 16.6E
04 11.3N
005 44.8E
ONNE

118
118

120

121

122
123

CAPT.
NALIN

08/03/2014
1334HRS

C.S. OFFSHORE

23/04/2014
2312HRS

IMB

30/04/2014
0034HRS
13/05/2014
1044HRS

IMB

MDPL
ASHA
DEEP
MT HELLESPOINT
PROGRESS
538090209
SP BRUSSELS

CAPT.
ASLAM

UNGIESHI
9261841
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06 17.8N
003 21.57E
04 56.71N
004 49.51E
04 45.82N
006 59.15E

124

PIRACY ATTACK

02/06/2014

IMB PIRACY
REPORTING CENTRE

MV LU HAI
IMO: 9159452

125

ATTEMPTED
PIRACY

10/06/2014
1134HRS

MR. DOLPHIN
NOVO

OML 120

126

PIRATE HIJACK

IMB

MT HAI SOON 6

127

ATTEMPTED
PIRACY
ATTEMPTED
PIRACY

30/07/2014
0519HRS
08/08/14
0349HRS
26/08/14
1930HRS
27/08/14

MERCHANT NAVY
LIAISON OFFICER
MRCC FRANCE

B.W LENA
MT SEA STERLING

IMB

SP BOSTON

10/01/2015
0725HRS

IMB
MALAYSIA

MT EQUINOX

NOT
GIVEN

10/02/2015
1240HRS
04/02/2015
0800HRS

OIC
RMAC
CRS

FV LURONG
YUANYU 917
MT KALAMOS
229776000

04 26N
001 43W
04 12.277N
008 04.281E

IMB

MT
REMI
MARIDIVE
603
SUFFER 1440
MT

05 28.5N
005 05.54E
04 14N
007 59E
04 18.5N
008 19.7E
AT

128
129
130

131

PIRACY ATTACK
ATTEMPTED
PIRATE
ATTACK
HIJACK

132

PIRACY
ATTACK

133

05/02/2015
1700HRS
19/03/15

135

ATTEMPTED
ATTACK
PIRATE
ATTACK
HIJACKED

08/04/2015

IMB
MALAYIA
DMSSS

136

ATTEMPTED

09/04/2015

IMB

134
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04-49.3N 008-18.2E
(PARROT ISLAN)
CALABAR RIVER.
DELTA
FPSO AMADA
PADANA
POSITION
CHAGING
04 45.0N
002 55.0E
04 14.45N
005 13.31E
OFFSHOR ABIDJAN

137
138

139

140
141
142
143

144

PIRATE
PIRATE
ATTACKED
SEA PIRATE

SEA
PIRATE
ATTACKED
PIRACY
SEA PIRATE
ATTACKED
PIRATE
ATTACKED
PIRATE
ATTACKED

18/05/2015
0306HRS
10/06/15
1105HRS
13/06/15
0821HRS
21/10/15
1820HRS
08/11/2015
1330HRS
9/11/15
19/01/2016
1150HRS

Suspicious
PIRATE
ATTACK
PIRATE
ATTACK

23/01/2016
1216HRS
29/01/2016
1311HRS

146

HIJACK

147

PIRATE
ATTACK

30/01/2016
2125HRS
11/02/2016
1724HRS

145

JRCC
NORWAY
CHAIRMAN
MARITIME
AKASSA
SHETTIMAH
&
WATCHMAN
INMARSAT C
ALERT
Fyi and Furthet
Aromire
Letter
JEVKON OIL GAS
CONNECT SHIPPING
OPERATION
MANAGER
CAPT. DESIKAN
08107977689

HIGH
KOTA
SAHABAT
SPEED BOAT

ANCHORAGE
3 51N
007 08E
OKOBOTUO

UNKNOWN

JETTY
OGBOKIRI
AKASSA
04 31.63N
004 38.71E
Bonny Area

TSL
INTREPID
MFV LILY III
MT
BREAKTHRUNG
SILVER SKY

03 56N
005 12E

MT BREEZE

03 52N
005 47E

IMB

MV AJEMISAN

04 05 N
005 25.50E

CRS

MT LEON DIAX

EMAIL

NAVE JUPITER

04 26.5N
005 32.2E
03 36N
005 37E
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148

PIRATE
ATTACK

12/02/2016
0432HRS

RMRCC
KOREA

MT MAXIMUM
357132000

3 55.5N
3 47.6W

149

PIRATE
ATTACK
PIRATE
ATTACK
PIRATE
ATTACK

16/02/2016
1208HRS
21/02/2016
1812 HRS
11/03/2016

MRCC
LOME

MT DEJIKUM

ATTEMPTED
PIRATE
ATTACK
PIRATE
ATTACK
PIRATE
ATTACK
PIRATE
ATTACK

150
152

152

153
154
155

INMARSAT C

JASCON 39
437641510

02 22.05N
002 31.90E
04 23N
000 05E
04 41.32N
007 09.46E

11/03/2016
2304HRS

IMB

MV GLYFADA
41346001

05 36N
005 13E

06/02/17

MDAT-GOG

BBC CARRIBBEAN

03.709N 007.939 E,
GULF OF GUINEA

08/02/2017

IMB

08/03/2017
1653HRS

CAPT. BRUCE

MT GAZ
PROVIDENCE
MT EBUNOLA

03 22 0N
007 13 5E
03 49.3N 005 21.44E

MT MISS LUCY
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APPENDIX 3
ATTACKS ON VESSELS IN NIGERIAN WATERS FROM JANUARY – DECEMBER 2014
JANUARY 2014
DATE
(a)

NAME OF
VESSEL
(b)
21 JAN14

TYPE OF VESSEL

(c)
MT KERALA

(d)
TANKER

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

(e)
LIBERIA

No OF CREW
ONBOARD

(f)
LAT O N03O 37
01N LONG 005O
08 23E

REMARK

(g)
27 Indian,
Philippine and
Romania

FEBRUARY 2014
SER

DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW
ONBOARD

REMARK

(d)

FLAGS
OF
VESSEL
(e)

(a)

(b)

(c)

(f)

(g)

(h)

1.

06 FEB
14

CHER

TANKER

PANAMA

OFF BRASS
RIVER
ENTRANCE

25 Philippines
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2.

06 FEB
14

OFFSHORE
TUG
MARINER
SEA

CARGO

NIGERIA

LAT 03O 49”N
LONG
005O13”E

3.

19 FEB
14

MT
MASTER
FORCE 11

TANKER

LIBERIA

LAT 03O 57”N
LONG
005:13”E

2 Indians
19 Nigerians

MARCH 2014
SER

DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW
ONBOARD

REMARK

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

1.

04 MAR 14

PRINCE
JOSEPH 1

TUG

NIGERIA

LAT
04O17”N
LONG 007O
53”E
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2.

04 MAR
14

SSI PRIDE

CARGO

MARSHAL
ISLAND

LAT
04O00΄2”N
LONG
005O16.6”E

3.

06 MAR
14

PRIME
LADY

OTHER

NIGERIA

LAT
04O11΄60”N

14 Nigerian
1 Ukraine

LONG005O44΄
04”E

4.

20 MAR
14

MT CRETE

TANKER

LIBERIA

LAT
4O14΄00”N
LONG005O
00”E

4 Greeks
2 Ukraine
4 Georgina
5 Nigerian
8 Ghana

APRIL 2014
SER

DATE

(a)

(b)

NAME OF
VESSEL
(c)

TYPE OF
VESSEL
(d)

FLAGS OF
VESSEL
(e)

LOCATION

(f)
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No OF CREW
ONBOARD
(g)

REMARK

(h)

1.

2.

23 APR 14

21 APR 14

MT
HELLESPONT
PROGRESS

TANKER

MT
METHANE
MICKIE HARPER

TANKER

MARSHALL

LAT
06O17.8”N

24

LONG 003O
21.5”E
BERMUDA

LAT
03O41”N
LONG
003O21”E

3.

29 APR 14

SP BRUSSELS

TANKER

BELGIUM
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LAT 04O
56.7”N
LONG
4O49.5”E

15

MAY 2014
DATE

(a)
16 MAY 14

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW
ONBOARD

REMARK

(b)
MT UNGIESHI

(c)
TANKER

(d)
PANAMA

(e)
LAT
04O45.80”N

(f)
16 Indians
1 Bangladeshi

(g)

LONG
006O59.15”E

JUNE 2014
SE
R

DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW
ONBOARD

REMARK

(a)
1.

(b)
04 JUN 14

(c)
WORLD
MARINE
711

(d)
FISHING
VESSEL

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

2.

03 JUN 14

MT
SAMPATI
KI

TANKER

LIBERIA

LAT 05O14”N
LONG 02O16”N

LAT 05O 56”N
LONG 02O16”E
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16 Indians
2 Ukraine

3.

04 JUN 14

MT
FAIR
ARTE
MIS

TANKER

LIBERIA

LAT04O47΄50.40”N
LONG 01O12.40”W

17 Pilipino
1 Ghana
4 Seri lanker
1 Myanmar
1 Charterer’s
representative Myanmar
2 Greek
Nationalities
onboard

JULY 2014 - NTR.
AUGUST 2014
DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

(a)
28 AUG
14

(b)
SEA STERLING

(c)
TANKER

FLAGS OF VESSEL
(d)
NIGERIA

SEPTEMBER 2014 - NTR.
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LOCATION

No OF CREW
ONBOARD

REMAR
K

(e)
LAT 04΄12”N
LONG 05΄15”E

(f)
1 Pakistani
9 Indians
6 Nigerians
1 Ukraine

(g)
Vesse
l is
Safe

OCTOBER 2014
SER

DATE

NAME OF VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

(c)

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

(a)

(b)

(d)

(e)

(f)

1.

17 OCT
14

SAINT
PATRICK

ACCOM
MODATI
ON

ST VINCENT
GRENADI NES

04:16N
008:00E

2.

25 OCT
14

MT STRIDER
(IMO:0514494)

06:19.19N
003:24.77E

3.

25 OCT
14

MV GRACELAND
(IMO:9571208)

04:23N
006:16E

No OF CREW
ONBOARD

REMARK

(g)

(h)

NOVEMBER 2014
SER

DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW
ONBOARD

REMARK

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)
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1.

4 NOV 14

IRENES LOGOS
(IMO: 9123922)

CONTAINER

PANAMA

40NM South of
Nigerian coast
04:03:31N
005:28E

2.

5 NOV 14

BASAT
(IMO: 9447029)

TANKER

MALTA

3.

5 NOV 14

MT SEA
VOYAGER
(IMO: 9044073)

TANKER

TOGO (TG)

04:00:58N
005:19:21E

4.

8 NOV 14

LADY
ELIZABETH
(IMO: 9446491)

TANKER

LIBERIA

04:05:87N
005:03:61E

18 Philippines
1 Romalnian4
Ukrainians

14 Turkish
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Pirates
boarded the
ship and 2
crew
members
were taken
hostage.
NN personnel
onboard repelled
the attack and 6
sea robbers were
killed. Two
AK47
magazines with
60 rounds of
ammo were
recovered.
Vessel is Safe.
Vessel
is Safe

5.

8 NOV 14

IDOMA RIVER
102 (TUG)

TUG

03:54N 005:29E

6.

8 NOV 14

IDOMA RIVER
103 (TUG)

TUG

03:54N 005:29E

7.

21 NOV14

SEA GRACE
(IMO: 8806682)

TANKER

Off Lagos
Nigeria

DECEMBER 2014
SER

DATE

NAME
OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW
ONBOARD

REMARK

(a)
1.

(b)
19 DEC
14

(c)
(d)
TORM
LOUISE TANKER
(IMO:9392482)

(e)
DENMARK

(f)
06:26.145N
003:19.625E

(g)
8 Danish
1 Croatian
1 Indian
12 Filipino

(h)
2 Robbers boarded the
vessel and immediately
the Captain notified
Nigerian Navy and
NIMASA. NN personnel
responded and made a
search of the area with a
patrol boat. Vessel is
Safe.
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APPENDIX 4
ATTACKS ON VESSELS IN NIGERIAN WATERS FROM JANUARY – DECEMBER 2015
JANUARY 2015
v

DATE
(a)
1.

(
b JAN
10
)
15

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW
ONBOARD

REMARK

(c)
MT MARIAM

(d)
TANKER

(e)
COOK
ISLANDS

(f)
OFF SHORE
ESCRAVOS

(g)

(h)
Ghana Navy rescued
the vessel 25nm south
of Tema Port
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FEBRUARY 2015
SER

DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW
ONBOARD

REMARK

(a)
1.

(b)
01 FEB
15

(c)

(d)
TANKER

(e)
NIGERIA

(f)
05:28:50N
005:05:54E

(g)
6 Pakistani
11 Nigerians
4 Egyptians
2 Bangladeshi
2 Ghanaians

(h)
The Master called
Local Authorities
and alerts all vessels
within the vicinity
and forwarded
message to Nigerian
Navy and Escravos
Port Authority.

2.

03 FEB
15

MT KALAMOS
(IMO: 9197832)

TANKER

MALTA

04:12:28.699N
008:04:26.519E

23 Crew members

3.

05 FEB
15

MT SIRA
(IMO: 9408803)

TANKER

MARSHALL
ISLANDS

06:26.6N
003:22.8E

22 Crew members

Pirates killed a Greek
deputy captain of the
ship, and took two
Greeks and a Pakistani
citizen hostage,
according to the Greek
government. The
remaining 19 crew
members are believed
to be safe.
Attempted Attack.
Vessel is Safe.

MT REMI
(IMO: 8805470)
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MARCH 2015
SER

DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW
ONBOARD

REMARK

(a)
1.

(b)
3 MAR
15

(c)
MV GREEN
KLIPPER
(IMO: 9001904)

(d)
CARGO
(REEFER)

(e)
BAHAMAS

(f)
LAGOS

(g)
14

(h)
Attempted attack. The
Master sounded
general alarm, Antipiracy, increased
watch level, all spaces
on deck closed and
sealed. Vessel is safe.

2.

12 MAR
15

MT SEA FORCE

TANKER

MARSHALL
ISLAND

APAPA 5
TERMINAL
LAGOS

21 FILIPINOS

Thieves boarded the
M/T 'Sea Force' and
stole about 5 cubic
meters of cargo (lube
oil). The thieves
jumped overboard
when they were
sighted. All crew are
safe / no injury.
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3.

19 MAR
15

MV MARIDIVE
(IMO: 9647007)

Offshore Supply
Vessel

BELIZE

04:14N - 007:59E,
around 18NM
South of Kwa Iboe,
Nigeria.

11 Egyptian
11 Nigerian
2 Client Rep

4.

21 MAR
15

YOHO

FSO

MARSHALL
ISLANDS

04:02.8N –
007:31.41E YOHO
TERMINAL

59 (Nigerians,
Ghanaians,
Americans,
Indians,
Philippines
and British)

(IMO: 7370181)

Two crew members
were kidnapped and
12 VHF’s and 2
Laptops were
reported stolen.
Investigation
ongoing.
Successful
attack.
Investigation
ongoing.

APRIL 2015
SER
(a)

DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW
ONBOARD

REMARK

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)
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MT HIGH MARS
(IMO:9366275)

TANKER

HONGKONG

06 17.4 N
003 23.3 E
Lagos anchorage

14 – Indian
6 - Filipinos
1 – Bangladeshi
1 – Russian

A source disclosed
that the two sea
robbers were later
captured by
Nigerian Navy
patrol boat. Vessel
is safe as no
casualty was
recorded

DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW
ONBOARD

REMARK

(b)
14
MAY
15

(c)
ITHUAKU1

(d)
TANKER

(e)
-

(f)

(g)
6

(h)
NIL

2.

14
MAY
15

MT RIO

TANKER

-

040 01’00 N
0070 05’ 00 E

3

NIL

3.

26
MAY
15

MT KARINA
THERESA

TANKER

DENMARK

-

15

1.

09
APRIL
15

MAY 2015
SER
(a)
1.

040 01’00 N
0070 05’ 00 E
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JUN 2015
SE
R

DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW
ONBOARD

REMARK

(a)
1.

(b)
8 JUN
15

(c)
MV BUTLER
SPIRIT

(d)
CARGO

(e)
NIGERIAN

(f)

(g)
18

(h)
NIL

040 13’52 N
0070 57’48 E

JUL 2015
SE
R

DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW
ONBOARD

REMARK

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

1.

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

AUG 2015
SE
R

DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW ONBOARD

REMARK

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

1.

Nil

Nil

Nil

Nil

Nil

Nil

Nil
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SEPTEMBER 2015
SER

DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW ONBOARD

REMARK

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

1.

Nil

Nil

Nil

Nil

Nil

Nil

Nil

OCTOBER 2015
SER

DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW ONBOARD

REMARK

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

1.

19 OCT
15

MV SOLARTE

TANKER

100 NM OFF
BONNY FWB

4

2.

19 OCT
15

MT
BRIGHTEST
STAR

TANKER

OFF BONNY FWB

2
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NOVEMBER 2015
SER

DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW ONBOARD

REMARK

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

1.

26
NOV15

MV SZAFIR

CARGO

CYPRUS

040 00’33N
0050 24’15E

16 Polish Onboard

Two boats
equipped with fire
arms boarded the
vessel.

DECEMBER 2015
SER

DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAGS OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

No OF CREW ONBOARD

REMARK

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

1.

11 DEC
15

MT ANANTA

TANKER

AGGIE BURUTU

90

5 Expatriates who
are mainly Indians
were kidnapped

APPENDIX 5
ATTACKS ON VESSELS IN NIGERIAN WATERS FROM JANUARY – DECEMBER 2016

SER

DATE

NAME OF
VESSEL

TYPE OF
VESSEL

FLAG OF
VESSEL

LOCATION

NO OF CREW
ONBOARD

SOURCE

REMARK

(a)

(b)

( c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

(j)

1.

13 jan 16

MV KULAK IX

Fishing
Trawler

Internation
al
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Armed Sea
Pirate Boarded
the Vessel

DODO River
Bayelsa,
Nigeria
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2.

15 Jan
16

MV AJEMISAN
IMO 9688051
MMSI 657126500

3.

14 Jan
16

MV AKEMI – JOE

Cargo

4.

14 Jan
16

CV 218

Passenger
Boat

Nigeria

Lat 000
05’00”N
Long 0050
25’ 50”E,
NM SW of
Bayelsa,
Nigeria

Nigeria

Internation
al
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Five Armed
Pirate Boarded
the Vessel and a
Patrol Boat was
deployed.

Lat 050 36’N
Long 0050
00’E Escravos
area of Delta
State

Internation
al
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Pirate Abducted
16 Passengers
and Two Crew
Members
investigation in
progress.

Ogbia /
Nembe,
Around 22 NM
ENE of Brass

Internation
al
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

No Casualties
were Reported
as the Assailants
were said to
have Retreated
after a heavy
Gunfight with
Security
Operatives.
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15 Nigerians

5.

18 Jan
16

MV WAO BENUE
MMSI 657011046

Security
Boat

CONOIL
Production Rig
IN Aunty
JULIE Field,
Bayelsa State
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Internation
al
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

The Passengers
were
Subsequently
Robbed and
Abandoned by
the creek side.
One person was
reportedly killed
and at least three
others sustained
injuries.

6.

17 Jan
16

PASSENGER
BOAT

Passenger
Boat

7.

19 Jan
16

RO-RO SILVER
SKY IMO 8519722,
MMSI 37320600,
CALL SING 3EZX8

Cargo

8.

19 Jan
16

MV KOTA SEGAR
IMO 9681235
MMSI 565357000

Cargo

Lat 040 50’N
Long 0050
40’E

Panama

Lat 030 58’N
Long
040 02’E
around 64NM
SW of
Bayelsa

Lat 030
05’06”N
Long 0060
07’E
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International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )
-

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Armed Sea Pirate
Boarded the
Vessel

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Investigation in
progress.

9.

19 Jan
16

TUG BOAT

Pennington
Oil Terminal,
Bayelsa State

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Investigation in
progress

10.

19 Jan
16

CREW BOAT

Passenger
Boat

-

Brass Water
Ways Bayelsa
State

16
Personnel
and 2
Crew
Members
were
adopted

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Investigation in
progress

11.

20 Jan
16

PASSENGER
BOAT

Passenger
Boat

-

Nembe Water
Ways Bayelsa
State

12 People
were
Adopted

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Investigation in
progress

12.

22 Jan
16

PASSENGER
BOAT

Passenger
Boat

-

Kula Water
Ways Rivers
State

1 Person
was
Adopted

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Investigation in
progress
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13.

23 Jan
16

SEA
ADVENTURER

Tanker

Nigeria

Pennington
Oil Terminal,
Bayelsa State

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Investigation in
progress

14.

31 Jan
16

MT LEON DIAS
IMO 9279927
CALL SIGN A8ZZ7

Tanker

Liberia

Lat 030
38.4N Long
0050 29.1E
Around
45NM SW
of Bayelsa,
Nigeria.

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Armed Pirate
Boarded the
Vessel took some
of the Crew
Members
Hostage.
Investigation on
the attack is still
Ongoing.

15.

4 Feb 16

PSKOV
IMO 963OO28

Tanker

Bonny LNG
Terminal

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Ship’s Crew
Foiled the attack
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16.

5 Feb 16

MV SAFMARINE
KURAMO IMO
9289207 MMSI
566416000 CALL
SIGN
9V9864

Cargo

Singapore

Lat 040 02’
02”N
Long 060
59’39”E

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Robbers
Boarded the
Vessel but was
foiled by the NN
who deployed 3
of its Vessels.

17.

11 Feb
16

NAVE JUPITER
IMO 9567038
MMSI 538005584
CALL SIGN V7FE4

Tanker

Marshall
Island

Lat 030 33’
17”N
Long 050
35’24”E

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Robbers
Boarded the
Vessel
Investigation on
the Attack is still
Ongoing.
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18.

11 Feb16

MT MAXIMUS
IMO 9346174
MMSI 375312098

Tanker

Panama

Lat 010 36’
34”N
Long 030
37’24”E

18 Crew
Members,
2 were
taken
Hostage. 1
Indian and
1 Pakistan
and later
released.

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

NNS
CENTENARY
and SAGBAMA
was deployed to
rescue the Vessel

19.

23 Feb
15

BOURBON
LIBERTY IMO
9573593
MMSI 258534000
CALL SING LXXZ

Cargo

Luxebourg

Lat 030 54’
04”N
Long 050
18’22”E

2 Crew
members
were taken
Hostage.

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Hijacked the
Vessel
Investigation on
the Attack is still
Ongoing.

20.

5 Mar 16

MT MADONNA 1
IMO 9407031
MMSI 370698000

Cargo

Lat 040 05’
45”N
Long 060
41’16”E

Panama
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5 Crew
Members
were taken
Hostage

International
Maritime Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attacked
the
Vessel
Investigat
ion is
Ongoing

21.

7 Mar 16

JASCON 67
IMO 9690779
MMSI 657124800
CALL SING 5NZX6

Tug

Nigeria

Lat 030 51’8N
Long 0040
39’9E

22.

11 Mar
16

MT BRIGHT WAY
IMO 9588146
MMSI 566422000
CALL SIGN 9V8755

Tanker

Singapore

Lat 020
46’03”N
Long 0040
54’30”E

23.

11 Mar
16

MV GLYFADA IMO
9104586

Cargo

Malta

20 Crew
Members.
16
Nigerians,
2
Ukraine, 1,
Honduran
and 1
Indonesian.
2 Crew
Members
were taken
Hostage.

International
Maritime Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attacked
the
Vessel
Investigat
ion is
Ongoing

International
Maritime Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attacked
the
Vessel
Investigat
ion is
Ongoing
Investigat
ion is
ongoing

International
Maritime Bureau
( IMB )
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24.

25.

15 Mar16

14 Mar16

LEKONI IMO
9684770
MMSI 375539000

MVSILVERMAID
IMO 8716863
MMSI 657826000

Tanker

Fishing
Trawler

St Vincent

100nm off
Brass

Around Dodo
River Delta
State
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2 Crew
Members
Were taken
Hostage Mr
YAHG
Jushan and
Mr Jiao
Shengli

One of her
Crew
Member
fell
Overboard
during the
Attack

International
Maritime Bureau
( IMB )

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

9
Attackers
, 1 Speed
Boat
(Blue
Colour,
Name:
PHOSE
Investigat
ion is
ongoing

Investigation is
ongoing

26.

26 Mar 16

SAMPATIKI IMO
9405772
MMSI 636015901

Tanker

Lat 040
20’00”N
Long 0050
12’00’E

27.

01 Apr 16

MT MADONNA 1
IMO 9407031
MMSI 370698000

Cargo

Panama

28.

07 Apr 16

MT NORDIC
FREEDOM
IMO:9288887
MMSI 311817000
CALL SIGN

Tanker

Bahamas

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Five kidnapped
crew members
have being
released

Lat 030 54’N
Long 0050
40’E

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attacked the
vessel
investigation is
ongoing

Lat 030
18.6N
Long 0050
23.9E
12 nm SW of
Agbami
Terminal
Bayelsa State,
Nigeria

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attacked the
Vessel
Investigation is
Ongoing
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5 Crew
Members
were
Abducted

29.

11 Apr 16

MT PULI IMO:
9330434

Tanker

Malta

Lat 0020 48’
43”N
Long 0060
40’ 95E
90 nm SW of
out of Port
Harcourt

6 Crew
Members
were
Abducted

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attacked the
Vessel
Investigation is
Ongoing

30.

11 Apr 16

M.T. OTTOMAN
EQUITY IMO
NO:9404950

Tanker

Turkish

Lat 030
17’08”N
Long 0050
31’00”E
10,2 nm
Agbami
Terminal

27 Crew
Members
on Board

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attacked the
Vessel
Investigation is
Ongoing

31.

12 Apr 16

CMACGM
TURQOISE IMO
NO: 9386471
MMSI NO:
63601459 CALL
SIGN A8RB5

Cargo

Liberia

Lat 040 07
33”N
Long 0050
24’ 12”E

2 crew
members
has been
released
safely

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Two kidnapped
crew members
have being
released
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32.

13 Apr 16

JOAN CHOUEST
IMO 8127347
MMSI 366847000

Tug

33.

13 Apr 16

AKEMI JOE
BUNKER 1

Tug

34.

14 Apr 16

MV PROVIDER 1

Cargo

35.

14 Apr 16

AKEMI JOE
TIMTASCO

Tug

Nigeria

6 Crew
Members
were
Kidnapped

Nigeria

3 Crew
Members
Were
Kidnapped
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International
Maritime
Bureau (IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attacked the
Vessel
Investigation is
Ongoing

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attacked the
Vessel
Investigation is
Ongoing

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attacked the
Vessel
Investigation is
Ongoing

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attacked the
Vessel
Investigation is
Ongoing

36.

16 Apr 16

MT REMY

Tanker

7 Crew
Members
Onboard
Nigerians,
4
Pakistani,
1
Bangladesi
, 1 and
Egyptian 1

37.

18 Apr 16

MT MADONNA 1
IMO 9407031
MMSI 370698000

Tanker

Panama

Lat 030 54’
75”N
Long 0050
38’03”E

38.

19 Apr 16

MV ARMADA
TUAH 101 IMO
9387293

Cargo

Malaysia

Lat 03
30’06”N
Long 040
50’00”E
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15 Crew
Members
Onboard,
2 Crew
Members
were
released
on 3 Jun
16

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Investigation is
ongoing

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attempted to
Board the Vessel

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

The Vessel is
Currently
Proceeding to
Onne Port

39.

20 APR
2016

AFRICAN
BEAUTY IMO
9047386

Tanker

Panama

Lat 030 53’
5” N
Long 0050
22’ E

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attempted to
Board the Vessel

Lat 030 45’
5”N
Long 0060
26’ E

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attempted to
Board the Vessel

Lat
03039.38N
Long
06008.24E
33.3
NM SW of
Brass River
Bayelsa State,
Nigeria

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Investigation is
ongoing

Brass River
Bayelsa State,
Nigeria

40.

20 Apr 16

BILBAO
KNUTSEN IMO
9236432
Call Sing ECER

Tanker

41.

20 Apr 16

VIGEO
ADEBOLA IMO
9355989

Cargo

Spain

105

42.

21 Apr16

MT IGBERE IMO
9206906
MMSI 657314000

Tanker

Lat 060
00’59.56’’N
Long
003023’49.68
E

43.

28 APR 16

MT OLIVIA I
IMO 9053111

Tanker

44.

28APR 16

MT GRACE

Tanker

45.

04 May 16

MT MADONNA 1
IMO 9407031
MMSI 370698000

Tanker

Panama

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Investigation
ongoing

030 56’59”N
0040 43.66 E
Around
67NM SW of
Bayelsa State,
Nigeria

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Investigation is
ongoing

040 19.0N
0040 27.0E
Around
78NM W of
Bayelsa State,
Nigeria

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Investigation is
ongoing

Lat 030 54’
01”N
Long 0050
17’06”E

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attempted to
Board the Vessel
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The
Captain of
the ship
was
kidnapped
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05 May 16

MT MOXON IMO
9133070 MMSI
538006405

Tanker

47.

05 May
16

AFRICAN
BEAUTY IMO
9047386
MMSI 37352700

Tanker

Panama

Lat 030 54’
00” N
Long 050
32’00’’E
Brass River
Bayelsa State,
Nigeria

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attempted to
Board the Vessel

Lat 030 52’
00” N
Long 0050
23’00’’E

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attempted to
Board the Vessel

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate went
away with the
Boat

1.2nm NW of
Agbami Oil
Filed
48.

05 May
16

PASSENGER
BOAT

Passenger
Boat

.

Kaa in khana
LGA
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2 Traders
were
killed, A
child and
the Driver
of the boat
were
injured

49.

06 May 16

MT HARLEY
IMO 9133082

Tanker

50.

13 May 16

MT
MONTESPAREN
ZA

Tanker

51.

25 Jun 16

MT
PHILADEPHIA

52.

27 Jun 16

MV LILLY II

Portugal

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attempted to
Board the Vessel

Lat 030 56’
00” N
Long 0070
02’00’’E
Bonny River
rivers State,
Nigeria
Around
Opobo river,
Rivers State,
Nigeria

Failed
Attempt

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attempted to
Board the Vessel

The
Captain
and the
chief
engineer
were
abducted

Intelligent
Report

Sea Pirate
Attacked the
Vessel
Investigation is
Ongoing

Qua-Iboe
river, Akwa
Ibom State,
Nigeria

One crew
member
killed

Intelligent
Report

Sea Pirate
Attacked the
Vessel
Investigation is
Ongoing
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53.

27 Jun 16

DREDGER

Dredger

Nigeria

Emeroke
River
entrance,
Akwa Ibom
State, Nigeria

The
Captain,
Chief
Mate and
2 other
crew
member
were
abducted

Intelligent
Report

Sea Pirate
Attacked the
Vessel
Investigation is
Ongoing

54.

07 Jul 16

PRINCE JOSEPH
1

Tug

Nigeria

Lat 03 09
42N
Long 004 47
20.22E

5 Crew
Members
Were
Kidnapped

International
Maritime
Bureau
(IMB)

5 Crew members
have been
released

55.

07 Jul 16

MEDIATOR

Passenger

Nigeria

Lat 03 11
40.009N
Long 004 41
3.166E

Failed
Attempt

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attempted to
Board the Vessel

56.

07 Jul 16

BOUBOULINA
IMO 9298753

Tanker

Greek

Lat 030
16’.91N Long
0050 09.71E

Failed
Attempt

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attempted to
Board the Vessel
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57.

08 Jul16

TORM THYRA

Tanker

Singapore

Lat 060 25 N
Long 003 22E

Attempted

58.

26 Jul 16

MR AQUARIUS

Tanker

Marshal
Island

Lat 060 26,
8.797”N
Long 0030
19, 37.283”E

Attempted

59.

05 Aug 16

MT HARLEY

Tanker

Marshal
Island

Lat 060 43,
3.408” N
Long 0030
36,8.923” E

Pump man
was taken
hostage
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International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

A Robber
Attempted to
Board the Vessel

Sea robbers
attempted to
board vessel

International
Maritime
Bureau ( IMB )

Sea robbers
boarded vessel

60.

17 Aug 16

MT VECTIS
OSPREY

Cargo

Isle of
man/UK

Lat 03054
22.5” N
Long 0070
10 9.541” E

61.

16 Sep 16

MV HANZE
KOCHI

Tanker

Gilbralter
United

Lat 040 10’
26.85’’N
Long 0060
59’ 24.334’’E

62.

12 Oct 16

FISHERMEN

Carted
away
outboard
engines

Opobo
River,Akwa
Ibom State

13 crew
members
were in
citadel

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attacked the
Vessel NNS
NWAMBA
intervened &
recued the vessel.
Vessel escorted
to FOT ONNE
by NNS
NWAMBA for
investigation.

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attacked the
Vessel 46NM
SW around
BAYELSA
AREA
Attack
Successful
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63.

13 Oct 16

PASSENGERS
BOATS

64.

14 Oct 16

LAGOS FISHING
PORT

65.

16 Oct 16

MT VAJARA

Robbed
their
valuables

Ataba –Kaa
waterways
Rivers State

Effort are
ongoing by
NNS JUBILEE
and
other security
agencies

Opobo River
Akwa-Ibom
State

Sterling
Oil
Company

Attack successful

2 robbers were
arrested by the
Marine Police
and currently
assisting in the
ongoing
investigation

Agege
Community
in Delta State

NNS Delta
deployed
personnel
on board
the vessel
1 killed
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Nigerian Navy

Killed 1 NN
personnel injured
some

66

16 Oct 16

67.

27 Oct 16

68.

27 Oct 16

Tanker

Lat 040 13’
40.77’’N
Long 0050 7’
40.83’’E

MT BLESSED

Tanker

Lat 040 16’
1.1’’N
Long070 31’
22.4’’E

MT NORTE

Tanker

Lat 060 16’
28.873’’N
Long0030 16’
51.175’’E
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International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

12 Armed Pirates
Approached and
attempted to
board the vessel
while enroute to
Lagos from PH.

ENC

Nigerian Navy

Attack
Successful

WNC

IMB

Illegal Boarding

69.

12 Nov 16

MVPACIFIC
PYTHON

Tanker

70.

19 Nov 16

MT MAYFAIR

Tanker

71.

19 Nov 16

MV MAERSK
COTONOU

Cargo

72.

19 Nov 16

MV BOURBON
ATLANTIDE

73.

23 Nov 16

MT ELIANA

Tanker

Lat 020 48’
33N
Long 0030
59’ 8.4E

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Sea Pirate
Attacked the
Vessel 147NM
SW around
BAYELSA
AREA, 5 Crew
members were
abducted.

Nigerian Navy

Not verified

3.2nm SW
Bonny FWB

Nigerian Navy

Attack
unsuccessful

4nm from
Bonny FWB

Nigerian Navy

Attack
Unsuccessful

Intelligence

Attack
Unsuccessful

34.1nm SE
Bonga Oil
Terminal

Lat 0040
54.279’’ N
Long 0040
48’26.935’’E
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74.

23 Nov 16

FISHINGN
TRAWLER

Ibeno
Channel

Akwa Ibom
State

75.

28 Nov 16

MV SARONIC
BRREEXE

76.

12 Dec 16

77.

15 Dec 16

Intelligence

2 fisher man are
hostages, efforts
are ongoing to
rescue the
victims

Cargo

22.1nmto
Ramos River
Entrance

Lat 040
57’02’’N
Long 0050
02’ 33’’E

20 Crew
members
were
onboard
the Vessel

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

3 Crew members
were abducted
Investigation
ongoing

MT ZEFYROS

Tanker

Lagos
Anchorage

Lat 060 18’
31’’N
Long 0030
21’ 66’’E

21 Crew
members
were
onboard
the vessel

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Attack
Unsuccessful

MT ANTARTIC

Tanker

QuaIboe
Anchorage

-

-

International
Maritime
Bureau
( IMB )

Attack
Unsuccessful
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78.

21 DEC
16

MAERSK
CALABAR

Cargo

Singapore

Lat 030
16’59.466’’N
Long 0050
09’ 42.131’’E
166.1nm SW
of Agbami
Oil Terminal
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combrest@pre
maratlatrque.gouv.f
r
(COMBREST)

Attack
Unsuccessful

APPENDIX 6
SUMMARY OF VESSELS ATTACKS IN NIGERIAN WATERS
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2014
Year

Jan 2015 till date

CHART SHOWING NUMBER OF ATTACKS ON VESSELS IN NIGERIAN WATERS JANUARY 2013 –2015
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FROM JANUARY 2013 – NOVEMBER 2015
Serial

Attacks on Vessels 2013

Attacks on Vessels 2014

Attacks on Vessels 2015

Total

Remarks

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

1.

3

27

15

47

FROM JANUARY 2013 – DECEMBER 2015
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APPENDIX 7
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FOREWORD
Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) remains an indispensable tool and process for
emplacing effective governance in the national maritime space. In the face of emergent
challenges occasioned by diverse threats and criminalities, it has become necessary to
address attendant inadequacies hindering the effort of Maritime Law Enforcement
Agencies (MLEAs) in checkmating illegalities in Nigeria's maritime environment.

As the Chief Prosecutor of the nation, I have interacted with most of the MLEAs and
come to appreciate the enormity of their challenges in taking custody of arrested
vessels, persons and evidences as well as ensuring that maritime offenders are
prosecuted in a Court of competent jurisdiction. In this regard, I wholeheartedly
identify with the noble initiative that produced this Harmonised Standard Operating
Procedures (HSOP) designed to guide the operation of MLEA. I am satisfied that the
document adequately addresses the issues of overlap of responsibilities of agencies as
it also spells out processes to be followed to protect the rights of both the MLEA and
suspects during arrest, detention and prosecution. In addressing the dynamic nature of
threat within the maritime environment, the HSOP will be reviewed every 3 years.

Effective implementation of the HSOP demands conscious domestication of its
guidelines into the doctrinal process of all MLEAs. I, therefore, urge all concerned to
ensure adequate knowledge penetration of the HSOP into the day-to-day MLE activities
across the nation's maritime space.

ABUBAKAR MALAMI, SAN
Attorney- General of the Federation and Minister for Justice
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL REGULATIONS
PART 1
THE COMMITMENT AND GOAL

1.
(1) This document serves as a guide and prescribes standard operating
procedures for the Agencies operating within Nigeria's maritime area in relation to
arrest, detention and prosecution of vessels and persons.
The Standard
Operating
Procedures

(2) Recognizing that in carrying out assigned statutory responsibilities,
maritime law enforcement agencies are empowered to effect arrest of vessels and
persons deemed to be contravening or have contravened the Laws of Nigeria or
International Conventions ratified or acceded to by Nigeria;
(3) Desiring to promote synergy through constructive dialogue and
wishing to further foster closer cooperation on matters of common interest in
maritime law enforcement;
(4) Mindful of existing mandates of individual participating agencies and
relationship among parties and understanding that the Harmonized Standard
Operating Procedures (HSOP) shall not prejudice the rights and obligations of all
parties under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)
and the various Enactments or Acts establishing the agencies;
(5) Re-Affirming their common concern to adopt a common document known
as HSOP andGuided by the provisions of the HSOP, hereby express commitment to
the faithful emplacement of effective maritime law enforcement including expeditious
management of actions and issues relating to arrest, detention and prosecution of
vessels, owners and crew who infringe on Nigerian Laws or International
Conventions ratified or acceded to by Nigeria.
(6) This HSOP is therefore prepared to outline the appropriate procedure for
arrest, detention and handing over of vessels consistent with global best practices. It
is based on the statutory powers conferred on the Ministries, Departments and
Agencies (MDAs) charged with maritime law enforcement activities. It is designed
for use by all agencies connected with arrest, detention and prosecution of maritime
related crimes, and illegalities committed, or suspected to have been committed
within Nigeria's maritime area.
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Purpose of this
document

2.
The primary objective of this HSOP is to provide consolidated guidelines on
arrest, detention and prosecution of vessels, persons as well as
seizures/forfeiture of goods (where applicable). It outlines proper procedures to
safeguard enforcement agencies from litigations arising from the discharge of their
legitimate duties. The HSOP is also relevant to those responsible for, or undertaking,
any enforcement related activities, in line with global best practices which also aligns
itself with relevant legal provisions of Nigeria.
The Primary
objective

3.
(1) The membership of the Stakeholders shall include those listed in Part 1 of
Chapter 3 of this regulation.
(2) The Observer agencies are as listed in Part 2 of Chapter 3 of this regulation.
4.
(1) The membership of the Stakeholders shall include those listed in Part 1 of
Chapter 3 of this regulation.
(2) The Observer agencies are as listed in Part 2 of Chapter 3 of this regulation.
Membership

5.
The core and subsidiary functions of law enforcement agencies for arrest,
detention and prosecution of vessels/persons suspected to be involved in the
commission of a maritime related crime as shown in the Table at Appendix 2.
Core functions
of the law
enforcement
agencies
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CHAPTER 3
MEMBERSHIP PART 1
1.
Membership of the Stakeholders Forum will be constituted by one or two
representatives from the participating agencies. This is to ensure that the Forum is
representative of all critical actors in order to create an optimum environment for
efficiency and effectiveness. Participants from the various Ministries and Agencies
are expected to be between top and middle management cadre.
2.

The membership of the Forum is constituted as follows:
a. Ministry of Defence (DHQ, AHQ, NHQ, HQ NAF)
b. Federal Ministry of Justice (DPPF,
NAPTIP)

NDLEA, EFCC,

c. Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FDF)
d. Federal Ministry of Transportation (NIMASA, NPA,
NIWA)
e. Ministry of Interior (NPF, NSCDC, NIS)
f. Federal Ministry of Finance ( NCS )
g. Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources (DPR)
h. Federal Ministry of Environment (NOSDRA, NESREA)

125

